Cleavages, Protest or Voting for Hope? The Rise of Centrist Populist Parties in the Czech Republic

Over the past two decades, populist parties have become a well-established part of many European party systems. Their rise has provoked extensive scholarly discussion aiming both at the conceptualization of and explanations for the reasons behind their electoral success, analyses of their electorate and the impact of populist political parties on the structure of party competition. Nevertheless, these conclusions have been derived from studies focusing either on the populist radical right (Betz 1994; Mudde 2007) or populist radical left parties/social populists (Barker 1998; March 2012), while the relatively new species of centrist populist political parties (Pop Eleches 2010; Učeň 2004) has been neglected in this regard. The article contributes to filling the described gap in the research on populism by analysing the supporters of centrist populist parties (CPPs) in the Czech Republic. Certainly, the Czech Republic is not the only country that has experienced the emergence of CPPs, with Bulgaria (Cholova 2012), Slovakia (Spáč 2012) and the Baltic states (Balcere 2012) being other interesting cases. Moreover, Slovenia underwent a party system change of a similar intensity in the early 2010s. Nevertheless, there are serious doubts about the populist character of the newly emerged parties in Slovenia (Krašovec 2012). Consequently, there are at least two reasons that make the Czech Republic a more suitable case for conducting an analysis of CPPs supporters. First, the Czech party system has experienced long-term stability. While the party system in the Czech Republic enjoyed a high level of stability until the emergence of the CPPs, both in terms of volatility and cleavage structure (Casal Bértoa 2014; Powell and Tucker 2014), the rise of centrist populism in Slovakia took place in an environment of continuous change characterized by a transformation of the main political conflicts. Although it was possible to trace some signs of stability in Bulgaria before 2001, the level of both extra-system and intra-system volatility was considerably higher in comparison to the Czech case (Powell and Tucker 2014). The argument about the higher level of volatility applies to the Baltic countries as well. The second reason for this is the richness of empirical material. The analysis is based on an examination of how different factors shape support for CPPs in comparison to support for the established parties that have been present in the Czech party system since the 1990s (ODS, ČSSD, KSČM, and KDU-ČSL). Both parties analysed here can be described as centrist populist. All the same, they differed in proposed solutions, which had implications for the profile of their voters and it is also important for the discussion about both the unique species of centrist populist parties and populist political parties in general, as we will later show. The paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the concept of centrist populism as part of a description of the rise of the new CPPs in the context of the relative stability of Czech party politics. Second, employing the most widely used approaches in electoral behaviour research, we will analyse who supports CPPs. Since there has been very little effort dedicated to the analysis of CPPs, we seek to test various approaches in order to understand the electoral base of the new populist challengers in the Czech Republic. We then describe our data and our method of analysis before presenting the results. Our conclusion sums up our findings and considers their implications. It has become some sort of a cliché to state that there are very few terms in the contemporary comparative political research as contested as populism (Canovan 1999; Stanley 2008). Nevertheless, recent research has led to the emergence of a consensus on the “nucleus of populism” (Rooduijn 2014) constituted around three interrelated elements: 1) the virtuous people that are 2) betrayed by the essentially bad/corrupt elites, and 3) the restoration of the people`s sovereignty allegedly driven by populists themselves. As Stanley stated, the “thin nature [of populist ideology] means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions” (Stanley 2008: 95). Indeed, history has shown a wide variety of populist actors that reflected the specifics of the environment, in which they arose, including populist radical right parties, agrarian populism and social populism (Pauwels 2014) as the most prominent empirical expressions of the “chameleonic” (Taggart 2004: 275) populist ideology. At the end of the 1990s, however, East-Central Europe witnessed the emergence of political parties, which lacked a clear ideological foundation and, at the same time, expressed very strong populist appeals. The term CPP has been used to capture the unusual identity of these new political parties based solely on populist appeals. In his analysis of party politics in post-communist Europe, Grigore Pop-Eleches (2010) defined new/centrist populism as one of the four types of unorthodox parties. New/centrist populist parties do not present a radical ideology. In contrast, they try to sidestep any ideology altogether and claim that they represent a non-ideological, anti-political alternative to the established parties. Their programmes are based on the claim that they fight the corrupt elite and pursue the interests of the people, promising to enhance living standards. As Pop-Eleches states (2010: 231), “such parties are almost completely unencumbered by ideological constraints and are therefore free to tell the voters what they want to hear”.2 Similarly, Peter Učeň (2004) used the term centrist populism to describe political parties that entered the Slovak parliament in the 1998 and 2002 general elections. Učeň explains the “centrism” of these populist parties in terms of their self-presentation as alternatives to mainstream parties without taking extremist positions and being located “directly or indirectly [in] the ideological or geometric centre of the party system.” (Učeň 2004: 47). Not only do these parties not present extreme or radical political attitudes, they lack a clear ideological profile altogether. Therefore, instead of a coherent ideology, the appeal of CPPs is often based on the promised competence of the leader, or on the claim to increase the participation of the people in the policy-making process. Both variants are supposed to lead to the same outcome – a better representation of the people. Going back to Stanley`s argument (Stanley 2008), CPPs lack a clear and coherent host ideology, the core of their identity is populism itself and solutions stemming from it, be they a competent leader, “common sense” or introduction of different forms of participatory or direct democracy. After the fall of communism and the first “grounding years” characterized by the turbulent development of political parties, Czech party politics became one of the most stable party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, typified by low levels of volatility (Powell and Tucker 2014) and a structure of well-institutionalized party competition established around the dominant left-right divide (Casal Bértoa 2014; Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). However, the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections called the previous stability of party politics into question (Havlík 2015a; Hanley 2011). The most spectacular feature of the general elections in 2010 and in 2013 was the success of CPPs, namely of Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV) and Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO) – see Table 1.3 On the contrary, TOP 09 – another newcomer from the 2010 general election – is not a part of the analysis. Although TOP 09 showed some elements of an anti-establishment appeal and an anti-corruption agenda, the anti-establishment appeal was not in the core of the profile of the party. The party presented itself as a “purifier” seeking to heal a right-wing part of the spectrum. As Séan Hanley (2011: 124) put it, TOP 09 “tried to present itself primarily as representatives of the mainstream centre-right, offering purer versions of conservatism or liberal conservatism […], as actors that could fix the failure of the established parties to transform the Czech Republic into a In other TOP 09 not see itself as an alternative to established parties the CPPs as an alternative in the part of the party Similarly, of of in the 2013 general was also not in the as the profile of the party was not clear before the and and it to the of populist radical right parties. the two CPPs had in was a strong anti-establishment which the political parties as and Indeed, was presented as the most important feature of the established parties and the they politics and (Havlík for called from the political or been in politics for more do other it as his and to make with and to be of the system of political Both parties can be as populist – strong anti-establishment to a the two – the and corrupt Stanley 2008), the of the people expressed to the of the people and their to make right was more in the case of in the case of (Havlík All the same, of the Czech populist presented a coherent programme in terms of that it “common sense” in to ideological solutions, that are Similarly, electoral was of the high of as to 2014), and they and an on and of the In other the populist and of the two new political parties the of CPPs. Since there have not been any CPP studies of our is in on both the established on populist and on the specifics of the of the CPPs described The has many explanations for people for populist political parties. We with who that is reason to that make their different from other (Pauwels it is to that populist factors the we and to the electoral support of CPPs in the Czech Republic. The which the of social positions has a in the of back to research in the in the and to cleavage and The main is that behaviour is by social as social or by place of social divide has to have three and to be a In this we only with the we the of social this of cleavage the The of the research a to the of populist parties that these parties are by the of (Betz who the in social with as a of the cleavage 2008). Indeed, empirical research has shown the of some in voters of populist radical right parties that are by or of the the analysis of for CPPs, the is that these studies on populist radical right parties. Similarly, the of analyses of radical left populist parties, which describe their supporters as people are to CPPs. The of the of voters will be in of support for CPPs in comparison to support for the political parties. of the as by the are with political a is an that a of or of is to the or Therefore, can be as of and behaviour political and In the two types of political are often to of the and are as political The second new political including and and Moreover, in the of the the is important and Kopeček 2008). 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