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This paper does not attempt to resolve the metaphysical question of whether consciousness and free will really exist, nor whether machines could literally possess them. Instead, it pursues a more modest and, I suggest, more fruitful aim: to show that it is possible, in principle, to construct machines that think they are conscious and think they choose freely, in essentially the same way that human beings do. To address this question, I identify functional requirements for systems that think they are conscious and think they choose freely. These include subjective self-report, opacity of underlying mechanisms, semantic competence, memory-based self-models, deliberation among alternatives, counterfactual reasoning, and practical unpredictability. I then sketched preliminary computational architectures showing how these capacities could, in principle, be realized using existing or foreseeable technologies. No single component is novel; what matters is their integration into a unified, self-referential system.
Abraham Meidan (Wed,) studied this question.
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