Escaping the Trap of the Weak

This article explores North Korea’s strategies to maintain autonomy and security while sustaining its alliance with China, within the context of asymmetric alliances. Focusing on the trap of the weak—the challenges faced by weaker states in alliances like autonomy sacrifice and risk of abandonment—it examines historical periods of the early Cold War and the post-Cold War era. The study reveals that North Korea’s approach involved internal balancing through the adoption of the Juche ideology in response to the loss of autonomy after the 1956 August Plenum Incident, and a nuclear programme to counter abandonment threats following the 1992 South Korea-China normalisation. Additionally, North Korea employed strategic hedging during great power competitions to enhance its position and regain support. These findings highlight North Korea’s successful navigation of the trap of the weak and offer insights into the strategies weaker states might use in asymmetric alliances.