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Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) marketplace is an emerging platform for CTI service requesters to countermeasure advanced cyber attacks, where CTI service providers are employed on payment. To create a trustworthy CTI marketplace environment, consortium blockchain based CTI service platforms have been widely proposed, where the blockchain system become the third role crucially impacting the CTI service quality. How to sustainably promote CTI service quality in this tripartite marketpalce is a challenging issue, which has not been well investigated in the literature. In this study, we propose a two-stage tripartite dynamic game model based incentive mechanism, where the participation incentives of the three parties are promoted under the constraints of individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC). The sustainability of CTI service is quantitatively formalized through the CTI market demand which impacts the future profits of the three parties. The Nash equilibrium of the proposed incentive mechanism is solved, where CTI requester offers an optimal price to achieve effect defense against cyber attacks, and blockchain platform and CTI service providers collaboratively contribute high quality CTI services. Empirical experimental results show that the higher quality of the CTI services provided in the marketplace, the more CTI market demand requested, resulting in a sustainable CTI marketplace.
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Zhou et al. (2025) studied this question.
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