Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason

Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ever a duty to ensure that laws are justifiable to those who are not willing to reciprocate? Most political liberals answer “no”—the duty of public reason is owed only to those who are themselves willing to comply.2 This reflects a more general view that has wide currency in democratic thought: individuals ought to moderate their political activity to accommodate disagreement with others, but only when others are willing to reciprocate. Many think, for example, that individuals ought to seek middle-ground policy compromises, but only with those who are willing to compromise. The prevailing view among political liberals is that the duty of public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance in this way. As Andrew Lister asks, “How could it be reasonable to ask me not to count a reason I think true and relevant on the basis that you reject it, if you are not likewise willing to exercise restraint with respect to reasons that you think true but which I reject?”.3 My aim in this article is to answer this question and, in doing so, to rethink the demands of public reason in the face of noncompliance. I argue that there is a wide range of political contexts in which citizens have duties to comply with public reason for the sake of others regardless of whether they reciprocate. This helps lay foundations for a non-ideal theory of political liberalism that gives public reason a more inclusive and morally significant role in the practice of democratic politics. In Section I, I examine what I take to be the strongest argument for the prevailing view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance. The civic friendship argument grounds the duty of public reason in the valuable communal relation that citizens realize when they reciprocally comply for the sake of one another. Because unreciprocated compliance with public reason lacks mutuality, it undermines rather than promotes relational equality. When individuals bear the “moral cost” of excluding what they take to be true reasons without demanding reciprocation from others, they allow themselves to be treated as subordinates.4 In Section II, I argue that the civic friendship argument misses an important truth about relational inequality—that whether unreciprocated sacrifice generates subordination depends on background features of the relationship in question, including the motivations of the parties and the history of their relationship. I identify two general political contexts—one with background equality and the other with inequality—in which unreciprocated compliance with public reason promotes rather than undermines egalitarian relationships. When citizens are committed to maintaining a fair overall balance of cooperative sacrifice, unreciprocated compliance with public reason can display a valuable form of respect without subordinating compliers. And in contexts with background oppression, complying with public reason without demanding reciprocation can help repair political relationships to a footing of equality and restore bonds of trust. I illustrate the reparative value of public reason by examining the case of caste-based injustice in India. In ordinary political contexts, then, citizens can have duties to comply with public reason without demanding reciprocation. Acknowledging such duties, I argue in Sections III and IV, helps reconceptualize the role of public reason in non-ideal contexts. If the duty of public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance, it will have only a marginal political role in democracies characterized by substantial noncompliance and injustice. The view I defend gives public reason a broader and more inclusive role in promoting the ideal of an egalitarian community. This does not mean that political liberals must abandon the idea that civic friendship has special value. Rather, civic friendship is best understood as a relational ideal that citizens of pluralistic democracies should strive to realize in the long-run. Liberals have traditionally sought to justify liberal rights and institutions by appeal to a wider view of comprehensive moral or philosophical truth. Mill, for example, defends by appeal to a theory of that on an of Political liberals that comprehensive of and the of the to which as a basis for the public of a liberal This is individuals and in will about such This of reasonable that comprehensive can a for liberal does it that citizens can accept the public of their political Political liberals answer that the of public reason important to be justified by reasons that reasonable citizens can accept given their own moral identify the of public reasons in of a of of that and to liberal and Political are of comprehensive are from liberal in the political of democracies without on comprehensive or philosophical The of public reason an moral duty of public reason, which citizens and to be willing to justify their political activity by appeal to a political of The prevailing view among political liberals is that citizens must comply with public reason only for the sake of those who are willing to reciprocally This that only citizens willing to comply to the of citizens to the duty of public reason is is not this view is moral duties are conditional on reciprocal compliance in this way. duties of to help to parties in If I by a with a I can reasonable I have a duty to regardless of whether they be willing to not think that can duties of public reason to those who willing to reciprocate? Political liberals have to answer this The view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance is without of the civic friendship of public reason have what I think is the argument for the view in the The civic friendship argument grounds the duty of public reason in the communal relation of respect that citizens realize when they reciprocally comply for the sake of one Andrew Lister the relevant form of respect in of laws are will their of political by they to the value of when seek to in that own about for This those to the of cooperative by that can accept the of democratic from their own moral Lister and about the of compliance for the duty of public reason to Lister defends a always have a duty to justify to who is willing to justify to defends a duty of public reason is only if a significant of citizens This the background for the duty of public reason to I a to is the duty of public reason owed when it does In accept the prevailing view that the duty is owed only to those who are willing to comply with the The civic friendship argument two unreciprocated compliance with public reason realize civic it is morally and be the of comprehensive Lister compliance with public reason a “moral the of what one to be true for the sake of a justifiable political This could be justified only if compliance a significant moral unreciprocated compliance such the argument only reciprocal compliance with public reason the value of civic Lister a for the view that public reason is conditional on reciprocal compliance when that to comply with a duty to who I not own The can be understood in of the ideal of relational equality. in relationships when one their to sacrifice their to be by others to is that individuals have an in to appeal to the range of their moral when about of political reason citizens to their for the sake of a justifiable political When this for but is not willing to a of And by themselves to bear this a of In what I to of by two ordinary political contexts—one with background equality and the other with background inequality—in which unreciprocated compliance with public reason important maintaining and promoting egalitarian democratic relationships. As an it is important to that of unreciprocated cooperative sacrifice not always they depends on features of the relationship in question, including the of the parties and the history of their relationship. When parties to a fair overall balance of sacrifice, they not in reciprocation of sacrifice to equality in their relationship. If two on a one always for this not any relational subordination if the other many other of when the balance of cooperative in a relationship is can help restore relational equality by without demanding reciprocation. If their for the sake of not themselves by without demanding reciprocation. Rather, they can help restore relational equality by their of sacrifice and the of As subordination can in relationships when individuals allow their to sacrifice their to be by noncompliance with public reason is not always or in this way. fail to comply they have never heard of political liberalism or the duty of public reject political liberalism in they comply if they that the duty of public reason but they it the of should that many people will the best for political liberalism who comply with public reason to the of those who a comprehensive of that the and of in a fair and way. And they be willing to comply with egalitarian laws that others fair democratic and to on in the democratic In such contexts, unreciprocated compliance with public reason not compliers. they a of unreciprocated sacrifice, but display a more general to their fair of the overall sacrifice to as help illustrate the an democratic with a of background equality and is a democratic with two political the and the The accept the duty of public that is valuable in unreciprocated and citizens of the the The not comply with public This is not they the of in the by the without the of compliance. not the best for political liberalism appeal to their comprehensive to justify a political that for citizens a and fair of has fair and The more a they have broader among the As a the laws more the than the The their fair of the by laws and with the to is of or injustice the and are and of the civic friendship argument that unreciprocated compliance with public reason does not relational in this but argue that it is morally unreciprocated compliance realize civic I think the best of political liberalism that individuals have an in that their in in of reciprocal does respect in that reciprocally justify political to one is of respect when individuals not justify their of or in of reasons others can is democratic The of answer to general of democratic example, that it is that it public to or that democratic is the of and of which respect demands And this of democratic will that citizens have an in whether or not they comply with public are to the of and to if they accept public In this I with that of the moral of public can by two cooperative The is of compliance and of of compliance when individuals comply with of a to comply others the of when as it, that who are in and who their as the and are to in an as by a of of compliance and of can can be reciprocal compliance with that not ensure fair and unreciprocated compliance with that ensure fair The is and when there is compliance or with respect to a when there is compliance or with of a given can be more or individuals can reciprocally comply with or and can a or of fair In the are not committed to reciprocal compliance with the duty of public comply the the display an to of compliance and In such contexts, unreciprocated compliance with public reason not compliers. real-world democracies have of injustice and that of injustice are not by civic such as the duty to the are conditional on of when a cooperative to and in a not have a civic duty to the of the on that of injustice are not by the demands of civic including the duty of public This is they can that fellow citizens not take their civic And as civic with those who take civic what if this with the view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance. of injustice are not by the duty of public reason fellow citizens as in a fair cooperative must and the of duty to be in the and the of fellow citizens are in the by doing their duty. This to of injustice. a to this in does not it any unreciprocated compliance with public reason civic the it can civic friendship in the fair cooperative that of injustice can accept from their own a of has of of injustice will be by the range of their civic including the duty of public This is valuable it is for civic never in what by or public reason helps to it. is that public reason can help repair political relationships by injustice and I think that there is about this and I a of it any to the idea a civic friendship two the civic friendship to unreciprocated compliance with public reason can help repair democratic relationships. The is that laws in that of injustice can accept a valuable form of the form of respect in complying with public reason without demanding reciprocation be in of civic which is by the respect of reciprocal compliance. with is that it grounds the reparative value of public reason in the value of civic friendship in the the of civic friendship an reason to about relationships by injustice. The more important reason is that it as a of respect to the of those who have that can that will not accept the of civic friendship and comply with public reason in the have an duty to repair their political relationship to a footing of equality and trust. If the of public reason can help so, this can a reparative duty of public If public reason is in reparative demands are not to be conditional on reciprocal compliance. duties are and, are in the that if must reparative for example, that not for they are in the that must reparative regardless of whether they have that the if their must take for the have if not have that those have the for in the in which they This can a duty to comply with public reason without demanding reciprocation. I have that the civic friendship has two about the reparative value of public think that public reason can be to repair relationships by In the I argue that the of public reason a of the of of injustice. is relationships public reason that it helps civic friendship reciprocal compliance in the I argue that moral repair public reason is valuable regardless of whether it to reciprocal compliance or citizens in a relationship as and of their are in the that they have of political and other democratic which laws are and which and and many others, I that citizens have a duty to their of political to institutions and duties of as to their as In a democracy, on others to ensure that laws and institutions as and of a fair cooperative fellow citizens and for laws and be to a that to the and are owed as and This is by the that and it for individuals to their Most people the of an Political a when they democratic to the of to their own is This when democratic institutions to cooperative on political on or I examine the case of caste-based is for many is in it in it is an form of relational of and not as and but as and of this subordination is to be as by and to and bonds of trust. are in when they and for and they are when they not for such laws but from I will the more general to to and the to to those who are to have a duty to the of in a that their democratic relationships with the of a relationship a of demands the of those who have reason can an important role in this reparative does not the for that a fair of and or for such as or that to The of public reason helps repair relationships the public of such does by a of the of of injustice. is that in their is an important relationships generates a justified on the of that they and are as a moral this of relational equality that can from their own that their This reparative such as must be and to have their reparative can be with the that when to moral but not that they as but if their moral are or with about moral be to that they are as repair in an important The of public reason and promotes that they are in two it the political of of what is that it institutions that political as with their own and have a reason to relational equality by the political they have and The of public reason does by that important are justified in of liberal and can accept from their own moral the of public reason promotes of the of in the of an and that the of cooperative and is justifiable in of public reasons can accept promotes their that their equality. If there is a on cooperative on the balance of political there is that in their political is more repair is best when can accept the public for democratic including the and that justify the This a reason to of injustice in the of public as understood as a political of an argument from moral individuals with comprehensive can I think the reparative value of public reason is in a of citizens of their by for their fair of is when of comprehensive and of I that an argument for rights can be from political and that public reason can have reparative value in the of such in many of not of any comprehensive or but of rights and as of a fair cooperative will be to examine a case in which public reason can such a reparative I will on the case of caste-based by the in India. to to the of the that has in the of a of for two The a of to in are and of this have and in the practice of and for in and and of the of as a the in to and of the and and of and of have the of caste-based and of political and to I think that political liberals will with two there is a duty of to help ensure that of a fair of and This will the and of the laws of India. there is a duty of public reason to ensure that important democratic are justifiable in that of the can is the of in which a duty of public reason is to are of public and that the democratic with for of liberal should be in the of public In of caste-based have a reparative duty to when that I to on features of the case that help this The has to with the demands for equality that themselves have have not sought public of a of or the as a of be more to that they have sought to the of the in political rights and fair the example, of the for and of the rights as a to the of in the broader and political of Political have reason to to demands in a that can from their own moral their as The of public reason a for doing caste-based the political the more general of in India. have duties to caste-based in the of in which it including democratic politics. important of the case is that are a and comprehensive a wide range of and the of this is what should of of with and The of public reason a of that for of the of of important of the case is that the has in the of a of for two is a of the of democratic on a comprehensive of the that political liberals many of caste-based have as with their and the have reason to their and appeal to a of political This case I that the of public reason can help repair political relationships by injustice. If it that there can be duties to comply with public reason without demanding reciprocation. As I reparative duties are not conditional on reciprocal must take for the they have regardless of whether they or have that the if their be of injustice comply with public reason they for example, that doing is reparative duties of public reason are not conditional on reciprocal compliance. I have two ordinary political contexts in which complying with public reason without demanding reciprocation a form of respect that egalitarian relationships. When there is background relational unreciprocated compliance can important without subordinating compliers. And when there is background relational the of public reason can help restore equality. In such contexts, the duty of public reason is not conditional on reciprocal compliance. I have only the moral of complying with public reason for the sake of those who accept public I have not the In the I whether the the from a political liberal that the duty of public reason is not conditional on reciprocal compliance in ordinary democratic contexts. This that citizens who accept should be in the in such contexts. is that including such citizens it more to that liberal institutions and are of injustice reject liberal and the their in the to moral repair undermines political aim of a public for This a to civic in a liberal are for the sake of it is important to that many citizens who accept the duty of public reason liberal This comprehensive liberals who that appeal to the truth about in liberal rights and the many democratic citizens who have idea what public reason or what the political and comprehensive but who liberal democratic and a fair such citizens accept the duty of public reason, they can accept public reasons by a political of This is political are from liberal without on comprehensive a public does not that it as the best that can be but only that they can that it is a or reasonable on This that that are justifiable to citizens who accept that are justifiable to many other citizens who accept This is a to a for political liberalism and a in of the the that including citizens who accept public reason a moral In many including such citizens does not of the political of one if of the public reason example, as to liberal citizens who accept public for to from the of of This that of the accept the liberal in citizens will have to be from the to ensure that liberal rights and institutions are This on the of public reason as a for moral it that of injustice will be from the This can be justified by the value of moral repair liberal are to repair political relationships to a footing of equality excluding citizens reflects the balance of moral from a political liberal it is not for political liberals to citizens who accept liberal from the to ensure that liberal are The is justified by the of institutions that liberal rights and political liberalism is in this respect will on it the question of with respect to should the liberal of and be If the are for example, individuals must accept as to public reasons will be to of a if individuals only a to and equality in a they have and of it that public reasons are to individuals with such which undermines public reason as a for moral and of the in is more a view that individuals must accept one of a of reasonable of liberal with range of special to and to of of political liberals answer the question of with respect to if of the accept it will be to justify liberal rights and if reject that of the accept public reason, that political liberals to defend will not be example, many political including there is a to there should be a to citizens who liberal rights and a to but reject a to as with the will of citizens have equality if they the duty of public reason and their they not accept public reason, they reject any for rights to relationships. is an important question of whether the for a to of for or depends on comprehensive and in of public that a to can be for political liberals to ensure that this to is to only those citizens who can accept a to in the citizens of the be not they reject public reason, but they reject to the of this is to that such citizens should only be with respect to Political liberalism does not have to an view when the is reason to be as inclusive as with respect to as many as if not can be justified to liberal I have that the that public reasons are to those who accept the duty of public reason the moral of including citizens who accept public reason in the it what be the of The of complying with public reason is to display a of respect to In for this to the political relationship it is important that of the respect can that they are if there is significant among a and democratic can those that to in the that to I this it to me that the only is for citizens and to the of a citizens must for who are committed to a public and practice of public reasons to of the and I to of reasonable comprehensive disagreement and the of be a of in the Many political liberals that of of the are committed to by public If this is what of is a for if citizens not accept to be it is they must accept for citizens must accept to be that reasonable disagreement is what citizens should have rights and such as of and and a to an I that citizens must accept such rights to be in the they must accept it is not they must that reasonable disagreement grounds The civic friendship a for public The idea is that citizens realize a valuable communal relation when they ensure that laws are justifiable to one in the face of in non-ideal democracies with noncompliance and the of this relation will only a and marginal to that the overall has the of an egalitarian community. This is the relation will have a will be only among the and of citizens who comply with public reason for the sake of one another. an egalitarian as a of moral the of and that political The view of political liberalism gives public reason a broader and more significant role in promoting the ideal of an egalitarian community. it defends a more inclusive of the is a of any liberal of comprehensive or is about political liberalism is on liberals that laws only be justifiable to the true comprehensive Political liberals that laws must be justifiable to citizens with a range of that democratic citizens have not heard of public reason, the view I defend is more more that of public reason as a of as I in Section II, public reason can be to help repair relationships injustice and This is an of equality and democratic in a democratic When injustice in can as to their they help equality in their political complying with public reason without demanding reciprocation a of that promotes a more When political liberals on of public reason as a for including others in the they take the those who accept their that comprehensive liberals take those who accept their compliance with public reason gives those who accept public reason and those who reject it the in the This a and democratic in which are and rather than and citizens can display such in their political in public reason and others to comply with I have in which complying with public reason without demanding reciprocation promotes the ideal of an egalitarian democratic community. the I with of the civic friendship that reciprocal compliance a to this This is it a form of in the face of bear the moral of restraint for the sake of their political relationship. compliance with public reason in the does not reciprocal compliance in the in which unreciprocated compliance with public reason can help an egalitarian democratic is by to reciprocal compliance in the to civic friendship is a of trust. to as civic in a political they be to take the without compliance helps this by a that a to as civic a of civic to reciprocal compliance in The prevailing political liberal view is that the demands of public reason are always conditional on reciprocal compliance. I have that this view is in a wide range of political contexts. can have duties to comply with public reason without demanding reciprocation. Acknowledging such duties helps rethink the role of public reason in non-ideal democracies with substantial noncompliance and injustice.