Professional accounting bodies' disciplinary procedures: accountable, transparent and in the public interest?

This paper critiques the public interest proclamations of accounting professions with particular reference to the role of disciplinary procedures in protecting these interests. It is argued that professions' widely declared concerns for the public interest, often conceptualized as encompassing a commitment to public accountability and transparency, are frequently used as a convenient mechanism for avoiding criticism and maintaining the power and privilege of delegated self-regulation. This argument is developed by examining the role played by disciplinary procedures, in particular the reporting of their results, in creating a perception that the profession acts in the public interest. The critique is supported with data derived from an investigation of the disciplinary procedures of one accounting body, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI). The results of this examination indicate that the ICAI process appears deficient in terms of its accountability and transparency and further that there is little fairness or equity in terms of the penalties applied to members for offences committed. This tends to support prior research which suggests that disciplinary procedures (and the ethical codes they purportedly enforce) fulfil a 'profession protection' as opposed to a 'society protection' role aimed at insulating the profession from inspection and assessment from outside parties. Implications for the accounting profession and for future research are discussed.