Shvidler -deference on executive powers under the sanctions-regime: an abdication of effective judicial control?

This article critically examines the approach towards judicial control over executive powers under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, as it has been established by the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs. It argues that the decision establishes a sweeping doctrine of judicial restraint for review proceedings under that act, termed here as ‘Shvidler-deference’. By accepting the government’s contentions without truly testing the rational connection between the specific sanction and how it could achieve its aim, and by balancing the impact on the individual against the abstract importance of the objective rather than the measure’s actual efficacy, the Court might risk that judicial control of executive measures under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 becomes illusory, thereby eroding essential constitutional protections of civil liberties and the rule of law.