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Modern distribution power system has become a typical cyber-physical system (CPS), where reliable automation control process is heavily depending on the accurate measurement data. However, the cyber-attacks on CPS may manipulate the measurement data and mislead the control system to make incorrect operational decisions. Two types of cyber-attacks (e.g., transient cyber-attacks and steady cyber-attacks) as well as their attack templates are modeled in this paper. To effectively and accurately detect these false data injections, a multivariate Gaussian based anomaly detection method is proposed. The correlation features of comprehensive measurement data captured by micro-phasor measurement units ( <tex-math notation="LaTeX">μ </tex-math> PMU) are developed to train multivariate Gaussian models for the anomaly detection of transient and steady cyber-attacks, respectively. A <tex-math notation="LaTeX">k </tex-math> -means clustering method is introduced to reduce the number of <tex-math notation="LaTeX">μ </tex-math> PMUs and select the placement of <tex-math notation="LaTeX">μ </tex-math> PMUs. Numerical simulations on the IEEE 34 bus system show that the proposed method can effectively detect the false data injections on measurement sensors of distribution systems.
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An et al. (2019) studied this question.
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