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ABSTRACTThis paper presents results from a series of survey experiments testing the effects of various arguments on relative evaluations of ranked-choice (RCV) and choose-one ballots. We examine data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), allowing for comparisons across racial groups. Reformers have emphasized the voter's ability to have their vote transferred to a lower-ranked candidate as a positive aspect of the system. However, we find that an explanation of RCV's vote-transfer properties does not increase public support. Furthermore, when given a choice between the single and ranked voting methods, a majority within each racial group prefers the single vote. However, Latino, Asian American, and MENA respondents express a stronger preference for RCV than white respondents. Democrats also evaluate RCV more favorably than Republicans. Furthermore, communicating that RCV helps elect more women and people of color increases support among Democrats but not Republicans across most racial groups. This is consistent with other findings around growing partisan differences in views toward diversity and descriptive representation. Finally, a message emphasizing voter confusion has little impact on public support for RCV. Arguments about the impact of electoral systems are found to influence public preferences more than descriptions of those systems' key properties.KEYWORDS: Ranked choice votingDescriptive representationPublic opinionElectoral reformRace Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Rae (Citation1971:, 17–19) distinguishes categorical from ordinal ballots. RCV systems use ordinal ballots. All other elections in the United States (including majority runoff, cumulative voting, and "at-large") use categorical ballots. See Shentrup (Citation2020) for an example of typical framing: "our current choose-one system." Other experimental studies on the U.S. "RCV question" have used similar designs (e.g., Maloy and Ward Citation2021; Boudreau, Colner, and MacKenzie Citation2020.; Blais, Plescia, and Sevi Citation2021).2 This emphasis is not unique to RCV. See Peña (Citation2021) on the approval ballot.3 "Low-information" here means a nonpartisan election or a partisan election with so many candidates that the party cue does not permit differentiation.4 These factors are separately and jointly predictive. See Shugart and Taagepera (Citation2017) for originating work on the "seat product" model (which combines them). The intuition is that diversity requires more literal seats to give out.5 Again, we stress the distinction between ballot type (ordinal vs. categorical) and other features of an electoral system. Many local elections are by majority-runoff. Many also ask voters to choose multiple candidates (i.e., are "at-large"). Some combine these two features. Recent RCV adoptions have been in all of these contexts.6 Note, however, that Australia has used RCV nationally since 1918, and voter education continues.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by The New America Foundation.
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Anthony et al. (2023) studied this question.
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