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In 1953 Charles Hartshorne and William Reese put together a book called Philosophers Speak of God.The aim of that book was to exhaustively categorize the possible models of God.Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher have put together a collection of essays that seeks to carry on the work of Hartshorne and Reese.Instead of categorizing models of God along the lines of different religions, as is often done, Models of God categorizes the various models along conceptual lines.Diller and Kasher have assembled an impressive tome in this regard.This book contains eighty-five essays that cover major thinkers, important issues within ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, and manages to cut across the religious spectrum in fascinating ways.One of the main motivations for this book is to deal with a particular question: what is the most philosophically and practically satisfying way or ways to conceive of the nature of ultimate reality?Models of God contains thirteen sections that will aid one in answering this question.Part I examines some of the epistemological and metaphysical issues related to modeling reality.Is it possible to model Ultimate reality?How does one go about doing such a thing?What does modeling look like?The first two essays by Robert Neville and Lawrence Whitney (respectively) start the book off on a rather odd note.Each claims that one cannot model God.This might leave one with the impression that she ought not read the rest of the book.After all, if one cannot model God and ultimate reality, why should one read a rather large book on models of God and ultimate reality?Thankfully, the arguments in these first two papers are rather weak, leaving the reader with no sufficient reason to think that ultimate reality cannot be modeled.Neville and Whitney both make the following two claims in their papers.First, that God is ultimately indeterminate, and second, that we cannot offer a model of indeterminate things.The idea seems to be that God only has a determinate nature-what God is like-when God is in relation to something else.Otherwise, God does not have a determinate nature-i.e.there is nothing God is like.I must confess that I found myself scratching my head at this point.Neville explains that God has essential properties regardless of whether or not God relates to anything.Yet, for some reason God only has a determinate nature when God is in relation to something else.It seems to me that, if God has essential properties regardless of any relations that God might stand in, this means that God has a determinate nature.There is something that God is like.So the claim that God is ultimately indeterminate is false.Further, Neville and Whitney do little to justify the claim one cannot model indeterminate reality.Within quantum mechanics, scientists offer models of indeterminate quantum phenomena.So what exactly is the problem for modeling an indeterminate God that has essential properties regardless of the relations that God stands in?We are never told.
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R. T. Mullins (2014) studied this question.
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