What question did this study set out to answer?

To characterize the asymptotic stability of strategy subsets under continuous-time, deterministic evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games.

November 1, 1995Econometrica

Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games

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Authors

KRKlaus RitzbergerRoyal Holloway University of London JWJörgen W. WeibullStockholm School of Economics

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Implication

Theoretical analysis demonstrates asymptotic stability criteria for mixed-strategy faces in normal-form games, indicating direct links to strategically stable Nash equilibrium sets.

Key Points

To characterize the asymptotic stability of strategy subsets under continuous-time, deterministic evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games.
Analyzed deterministic selection dynamics formulated in continuous time across normal-form games.
Evaluated the asymptotic stability of sets of population states, specifically targeting faces within the mixed-strategy space across a general class of evolutionary dynamics.
Characterized the precise faces of the mixed-strategy space that maintain asymptotic stability across an entire defined class of selection dynamics.
Proved that every asymptotically stable face contains an essential component of the Nash equilibrium set, thereby ensuring strategic stability in the Kohlberg-Mertens sense.

Cite This Study

Ritzberger et al. (1995) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a15641f79ff98d0de4e8faa https://doi.org/10.2307/2171774

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Implication

Theoretical analysis demonstrates asymptotic stability criteria for mixed-strategy faces in normal-form games, indicating direct links to strategically stable Nash equilibrium sets.

Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

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