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Theoretical analysis demonstrates asymptotic stability criteria for mixed-strategy faces in normal-form games, indicating direct links to strategically stable Nash equilibrium sets.
This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
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Ritzberger et al. (1995) studied this question.
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