September 1, 1996

Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

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Abstract

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397

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Agrawal et al. (Sun,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a1565fbb2e0231f15826d23 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2331397

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