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I argue that Heraclitus has an implicit theory of action: successful intentional action is dependent on a grasp of logos which is a causal account of all things in the cosmos. My analysis of Heraclitus hinges on the concept of gnōmē, which I will show is a manifestation of the juncture between understanding logos and intentional action. Gnōmē, which allows divine fire to steer ‘everything through everything’ in B41, consists of three parts: the capacity for forming a plan, the plan, and the delivery. I will illustrate how failure to perform successful action comes from a lack of gnōmē by focusing on two parts in particular — delivery and the plan. I will look at the relationship between understanding and control and how (a lack of) physical control impacts the delivery of a plan for the drunken man in B117, as well as how knowledge can influence the suitability of the plan itself by examining Heraclitus’ fragments on religion.
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Zoë Audra (2024) studied this question.
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