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Part 1 Introduction: game theory equilibrium evolutionary games evolution evolution and equilibrium the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution of models: evolutionarily stable strategies alternative notions of evolutionary stability synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration and imitation model time sample paths stationary distributions limits. Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics equilibrium strictly dominated strategies weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs. Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game an ultimatum minigame numerical calculations relevance to experimental data? leaving money on the table. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction the model when can drift be ignored? when drift matters examples discussion. Part 7 Noise: the model limit distributions alternative best replies trembles. Appendix: proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction the model recurrent outcomes backward induction forward induction markets. appendix: proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model dynamics equilibrium selection risk dominance discussion.
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Mezzetti et al. (1998) studied this question.
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