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AbstractThis paper investigates how agenda content and floor behaviour in the US House of Representatives vary across regular and lame-duck sessions. The presence of departing members created a legislative environment marked by increased ideological and participatory shirking, resulting in higher levels of uncertainty. That uncertainty affected how members devised proposal strategies in the face of more fluid voting patterns in lame-duck sessions. The analysis of a unique data set comprised of roll-call votes on House floor motions with an identifiable sponsor from 1879 to 2010 (the 46th to 111th Congresses) uncovers significant changes in the relative frequencies of particular categories of votes, in the success rates on votes within those categories, as well as in the spatial characteristics of floor motions. These findings underscore how the move to the lame-duck session ushered in a distinct and different legislative environment.Keywords: lame-duck sessionshirkingspatial modelroll-call voting AcknowledgementsThis research was supported by a grant from the Dirksen Congressional Centre. The author thanks Nolan McCarty and Keith Poole for generously sharing their data on floor motions. Thanks also to Craig Goodman, Jeff Jenkins, Keith Poole, Eric Schickler, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this paper.Notes1. Items passed in the lame-duck session of the 111th Congress included an extension of the tax cuts enacted during the Bush administration, the end of the ‘Don't Ask Don't Tell’ policy related to the service of gays in the military, and the Senate's ratification of the START treaty with Russia.2. The lame-duck sessions of the post-Twentieth Amendment era convene under a very different set of institutional arrangements compared with the pre-Twentieth Amendment era. The era of the regularly occurring lame-duck session underwent a number of important political changes. Numerous states adopted the Australian, or secret ballot (Fredman, Citation1968; Rusk, Citation1970), and the process for selecting House candidates changed significantly over this time. In particular, the process changed from one dominated by party organisations to a system of direct primaries in which citizens chose the parties' candidates for office (Ware, Citation2002). By comparing across the two eras, one gains some leverage to evaluate how broad political changes influence roll-call behaviour in lame-duck sessions. In terms of candidate selection, for instance, procedures are essentially held constant for the post-Twentieth Amendment era as the use of direct primaries to select candidates is, for all intents and purposes, universal.3. For more detailed discussions of the evolution of the congressional calendar and on efforts to eliminate the lame-duck session, see Crowe (Citation1969), Goodman and Nokken (Citation2004), Jenkins and Nokken (Citation2008a, Citation2008b), Kyvig (Citation2004), and Norris (Citation1945).4. These include the 76th–78th, 80th–81st, 91st, 96th–97th, 103rd, and the 105th–112th Congresses.5. Quite simply, the influence of party leaders and party organisations differs across these two eras. In the recent era, the responsibility of waging re-election campaigns lies with the members themselves. The move from a party-centred nomination system to a candidate-based system started during the pre-Twentieth Amendment era. The adoption of primary elections for candidate selection, though, took place on a state-by-state basis over the course of several years (Ware, Citation2002). In the post-Twentieth Amendment era, however, virtually all candidates are selected in direct primaries.6. Speaker Thomas B. Reed (R-ME) argued that the lame-duck session was ‘one in which a great deal of business was transacted and that happens because everybody knows that the time is limited, and everybody sets to work’ (quoted in Kennedy, Citation1926, p. 236).7. A majority roll results when a measure passes while being opposed by a majority of the majority party. A minority roll occurs when a measure passes over the majority opposition of the minority party.8. The assumption of a one-dimensional policy space is used for two reasons. First, and most basically, working along a single dimension makes the categorisation of votes tractable. Identifying the median member of the chamber along with the spatial location of the winning and losing proposals in two-dimensional space is extremely difficult. Second, empirical evidence suggests that for the majority of American history political conflict took place along a single policy dimension (Poole & Rosenthal, Citation1997). Substantively, they argue that this dimension is best characterised as a liberal-conservative dimension in which parties are divided over the proper level of government involvement in the economy.9. Note, the logic also holds for the converse ordering. For instance, a spatial array of Q < M < P in which ||Q – M|| > ||P – M|| is categorised as spatial scenario 1.10. The DREAM Act was a proposed immigration reform that would have enabled some undocumented immigrants to earn green cards and possibly citizenship if they attended college or joined the US military.11. These are the set of votes that can be scaled via the DW-NOMINATE procedure, which requires that at least 2.5 per cent of the members vote in opposition to the winning side.12. A congress-by-congress documentation of the number of roll-call votes, the number of floor motions, the relative frequencies and success rates for votes within each of the four spatial scenarios for regular and lame-duck sessions is available from the author.13. These measures are derived from multiple data sources available at Poole's Voteview website (http://voteview.com). The vote margin data are available at hdemrep35_111.dat, while the spread and midpoint data are included in the DW-NOMINATE roll-call coordinate data set (hc01111E21_PRES_PRE_DATES.dat).14. A two-tailed test is used as there are not strong ex ante expectations regarding the direction of change.Additional informationNote on AuthorTimothy P. Nokken is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, USA
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