Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
In this paper, the concept of 'affordance' is given an ontological and epistemological explication building on a Merleau-Pontian view of human being as always already being-in-the world in a non-thematized, pre-reflective correspondence of body and world in the concrete activity. A dynamic, agent-centred, cultural-, experience- and skill-relative, but perception-independent, ontology is proposed for affordances. It is argued that this is more in line with the original Gibsonian understanding of the concept than a recent attempt by McGrenere and Ho, because the latter fall back upon the subject-object-dichotomy that Gibson was trying to transcend.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Nina Bonderup Dohn (2006) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: