North Korea's intransigent behaviour has led many in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to question the wisdom of policies that aim at persuading rather than coercing Pyongyang into cooperation. For critics of engagement, the solution for dealing with this rogue regime is simple: squeeze the regime until it either concedes or collapses. Yet, containment and robust defence are necessary but not sufficient conditions for dealing with the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK). While such policies can successfully deter a second invasion on the peninsula, they do not adequately address a new dimension of the DPRK threat: its capacity for undermining the non-proliferation and missile-technology control regimes. Engagement with North Korea, though distasteful, is still a better strategy than diplomatic isolation or coercion. However, engagement without certain additional measures on the military front is not advisable. In particular, if policy-makers in Washington and Seoul seek to make engagement more 'credible', this has implications for theatre-missile defence (TMD) initiatives in the region. US-ROK cooperation on certain forms of TMD can make for an 'enhanced' engagement strategy which is both more credible to Pyongyang and less susceptible to domestic accusations of appeasement.
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Victor Cha (2000) studied this question.
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