Randomized trial evaluates Ukraine's integration into NATO frameworks, suggesting a new security approach.
NATO’s best course on Ukraine would be to serve as a backstop under a transitional, non–Article 5 framework that is operational and not symbolic. This approach should rest on four pillars: a sustainable Ukrainian force posture; functional NATO integration in planning, inter-operability, and shared air and missile warning with embedded advisers; EU–anchored economic and institutional resilience; and a clear deterrence regime with hybrid defence coordination and graduated responses. To endure amid transatlantic volatility, the backstop should be institutionalised, spoiler–resilient, and built with European redundancy under common NATO standards and flexible coalitions. It would mitigate escalation, entrapment and ‘frozen conflict’ risks by establishing clarity, presence and pre–agreed responses while recognising Russia’s ongoing grey–zone pressure. The backstop should be considered a bridge, not a substitute, for membership, linking practical integration now to possible future accession when allies agree and conditions allow. The aim is to stabilise Europe’s eastern flank and anchor a durable post–2022 security architecture.
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Claes Levinsson (2026) studied this question.
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