August 1, 2002

Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

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Abstract

Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer by P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt and T. Groseclose. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1138-1151 of American Economic Review, September 2002

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Chiappori et al. (Thu,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a176a7d40149b897cb401fa https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344678

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