Article 8. The Silent Dimensions: Integrity, Inaction, and the Completeness of Moral Ontology

Moral ontologies routinely treat certain foundational concepts as self-evident — and in doing so leave them structurally underspecified. This article examines two such concepts within the Axiomatic Theory of Tragic Subjecthood (ATTS): integrity and inaction. Properly understood, integrity is not a moral property of agents but an ontological condition under which the existence of subjects remains possible. Inaction is not the absence of a decision but a decision with displaced, structurally traceable consequences. The article's central argument: neither concept alone is sufficient to close the corresponding gap in moral ontology. Only together do they deliver the completeness condition — a criterion by which a system is complete (in the coverage sense) when no form of subject existence and no form of decision falls outside its conceptual apparatus. The article proves Lemma 5 (the minimality of the pair {Integrity, Inaction}) and proposes an operational completeness test applicable to any moral ontology that claims foundational status. Section 4, where this criterion is developed, is the article's centre of gravity; Sections 2 and 3 are preparatory. Completeness in this sense is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a moral ontology's correctness: a system may cover all configurations and still assign statuses incorrectly. This distinction is the explicit subject of Section 4.