This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, a similar independence result holds for ex post efficient mechanisms that are individually rational, provided the players' budgets satisfy a certain condition. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory, surplus extraction by an informed principal and egalitarian mechanisms.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Damme et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: