Cognitive Complexity and the Tendency to Make Extreme Judgments

This report is based upon a partial analysis of data from a larger study. The intent, here is to present findings which add to the construct validity of 'cognitive complexity,' a variable receiving much emphasis in the current literature (Crockerr, 1965). We explored the relation of cognitive complexity to the set to make extreme cognitive judgments. Cognitive complexiry was measured by requesting Ss to describe 2 people, someone they liked, someone they disliked. The measure of cognitive complexity was operationally defined by the number of interpersonal constructs available to S, i.e., used in the two descriptions. The more complex S, the more categories available to him. In the present study, 166 Ss (66 males and 100 females) from an introductory psychology class were measured for their degree of complexity by a method identical to that used by Nidorf and Argabrite (1968). Ss also judged a number of concepts (such as Self, Others, Nature and the like) by using a 12-scale Semantic Differential. Measures of extreme responsiveness were obtained from the Semantic Differential scales: the midpoint of each scale was defined as 0, and each subsequent point away from 0 (on both sides) was +1, +2, or +3. The scales were summed over all concepts, and the total score indicated the degree of extremeness. Both the cognitive complexity and the extremeness distributions were split at the median, and Ss were cross-classified as 'high' or 'low' on each measure. A chi.square analysis indicates that cognitively complex Ss tended to make extreme cognitive judgments (X3 = 9.302, df = 1, p < ,005). When Ss were separated by gender and the analysis performed again, only the female distribution was significant (X 8.100, df = 1, p < ,005). Examination of the contingency tables indicates that the male frequencies were in the same direction as those of the female. The present findings may be thought of in terms of the adaptive relevance of cognitive complexity. It seems reasonable to assume that the number of cognitive categories one has available to code his environment is correlated with the number of stimulus differentiations that he can make. Thus, when the individual is asked to make a judgment about an aspect of his environment, the more he can differentiate that aspect, the more confident he will be in his judgment. This confidence, then, is reflected in extreme judgmenrs. The latter interpretation is consistent with the findings of Wallach and Caron (1959), wherein extreme judgments were associated with subjective certainty.