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This paper presents a general-equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region-specific earnings risk. Interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks; state-contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency. With perfect capital markets, labor-market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality. If instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes, labor-market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition, shifting the burden of taxation to low-skilled immobile workers. Decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient. (JEL H00)
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David E. Wildasin (2000) studied this question.
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