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Demonstrates that inaccurate consumer expectations can enhance social welfare in network industries, suggesting a conflict between firms and societal interests.
This study develops a unified framework for markets with network externalities that generalizes the traditional dichotomy between passive and responsive expectations.We demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom, social welfare may increase when consumers form "inaccurate" (out-of-equilibrium) expectations, provided that expected demand is sufficiently price-elastic.These elastic expectations act as an endogenous constraint on monopoly pricing, mitigating the underproduction distortion through the logic of the theory of second best.We further show that although monopolist's profit is maximized under responsive expectations, social welfare is higher when expectations are highly elastic, revealing a conflict of interest between the firm and society.Extending the analysis to a differentiated duopoly, we show that the disciplinary mechanism is reinforced by a novel crossexpectation effect.The conflict of interest also acquires a richer structure: under competition, firms may strictly prefer passive expectations to responsive expectations equilibrium because inelastic consumer expectations soften price competition and alleviate the prisoner's dilemma in pricing.
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亮真 北村 (2026) studied this question.
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