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Investigates decision fusion to enhance spectrum sensing, indicating improved attack mitigation strategies.
This paper investigates attack- and channel-aware decision fusion for Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (RIS)-enhanced Cooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) to mitigate the challenge from Byzantine attacks. Specifically, we first propose the optimal hard decision fusion rule for the Fusion Center (FC) based on maximum-likelihood criterion, which simultaneously accounts for channel impairments and statistical characteristics of Byzantine attacks. Following from this result, we then derive three suboptimal and low-complexity decision fusion rules when the Channel State Information (CSI) cannot be perfectly achieved at the FC. The correspondingly results indicate that negative weighting coefficients can be adaptively assigned to malicious reports based on attack intensity, which can successfully transform adversarial interference into effective detection gains for the FC in some scenarios. This finding profoundly reveals the intrinsic mechanism of how Byzantine attacks impact the decision fusion, and thus provide a rigorous theoretical perspective for developing robust decision fusion rule capable of adaptively suppressing and conversely exploiting malicious reports. Furthermore, to make practical implementation of our decision fusion rules, we develop simple and unbiased attack parameter estimation algorithms based on the first-order statistics of received reports at the FC, which also exhibits good convergence. Our results indicate that we can insert a virtual source under control, and send false data to the Byzantine attackers. This deception strategy can help the FC successfully learn the attack parameter aided by its collected data. Finally, extensive simulations are conducted and the correspondingly results demonstrate that our proposed fusion rules can effectively mitigate Byzantine attacks across a wide range of attack scenarios, and they can outperform traditional malicious report filtering defense algorithm by successfully reversing and exploiting malicious reports.
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Zhang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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