Contract Coordination and Government Subsidy Mechanism of Agricultural Product Supply Chain With Adverse Weather

To enhance the stability of the agricultural product supply chain (APSC) under adverse weather conditions, this study examines contract coordination and government subsidy mechanism. First, we develop a two‐echelon APSC including a farmer and a company and establish stochastic profit functions to reflect the impact of adverse weather on agricultural product quality. Then, we construct Stackelberg game models based on different contracts (wholesale price contract, revenue‐sharing contract, and “revenue‐sharing + franchise fee” contract) and government subsidies (output subsidy and sale subsidy). Finally, we conduct numerical analysis to compare the effects of various contracts and government subsidies on APSC decision‐making, as well as the influence of various subsidies on contract coordination. The research demonstrates that adverse weather can deviate APSC performance from the optimum. However, contract coordination and government subsidies enhance supply chain performance. The revenue‐sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination, but at a higher revenue‐sharing ratio, the profit of the company declines. The “revenue‐sharing + franchise fee” contract not only achieves supply chain coordination but also improves profits for all parties. Furthermore, output subsidy exhibits a broader coordination scope than the sale subsidy under the “revenue‐sharing + franchise fee” contract. Regardless of the contract type, output subsidy generally leads to higher overall social welfare compared to sale subsidy, while sale subsidy is higher in terms of fund utilization efficiency.