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Since interest-relative invariantism (hereafter, IRI) was introduced into contemporary epistemology in the early 2000s, it has been criticised on a number of fronts.This paper responds to six different criticisms of IRI launched by five different authors.And it does so by noting that the best version of IRI is immune to the criticisms they have launched.The 'best version' in question notes three things about IRI.First, what matters for knowledge is not strictly the stakes the agent faces in any decision-problem, but really the odds at which she has to bet.Second, IRI is a relatively weak theory; it just says interests sometimes matter.Defenders of IRI have often derived it from much stronger principles about reasoning, and critics have attacked those principles, but much weaker principles would do.Third, and most importantly, interests matter because generate certain kinds of defeaters.It isn't part of this version of IRI that an agent can know something in virtue of their interests.Rather, the theory says that whether a certain kind of consideration is a defeater to an agent's putative knowledge that p depends on their interests.This matters for the intuitive plausibility of IRI.Critics have argued, rightly, that interests don't behave in ways distinctive of grounds of knowledge.But interests do behave like other kinds of defeaters, and this undermines the criticisms of IRI.In recent years a number of authors have defended the interest-relativity of knowledge and justification.Views of this form are floated by John Hawthorne ( 2004), and endorsed by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2002, 2009), Jason Stanley (2005) and Brian Weatherson (2005).The various authors differ quite a lot in how much interestrelativity they allow, but what is common is the defence of interest-relativity.These views have, quite naturally, drawn a range of criticisms.The primary purpose of this paper is to respond to these criticisms and, as it says on the tin, defend interestrelative invariantism, or IRI for short.But I don't plan to defend every possible version of IRI, only a particular one.Most of the critics of IRI have assumed that it must have some or all of the following features.1.It is harder to know things in high-stakes situations than in low-stakes situations.2. There is an interest-sensitive constituent of knowledge.3. IRI stands and falls with some principles connecting knowledge and action, such as the principles found in Hawthorne and Stanley (2008).
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Brian Weatherson (2011) studied this question.
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