On the Theory of Party Organization

Assessments of the condition of our political parties reveal as much about the disarray in our theory of parties as they do about the actual disarray in the parties themselves. This paper argues that in the literature there exists a cumulative theory that explains most of what we know about parties. At the level of party competition this has been laid down by Downs and his successors. The rational-choice model, however, says little about party organization. A theory of party organization can be developed from similar assumptions, thus providing a realistic yet compatible theory of parties. The character of the political party emerges from the fact that it combines three facets of organization in a unique manner: (1) the party maintains itself through market-exchange, making it similar to the business firm and thus unlike the interest group or public bureau; (2) the party's output consists of collective goods, making it similar to the interest group and public bureau yet unlike the business; and (3) the party compensates its participants indirectly, making it similar to the interest group yet unlike the bureau or business. Party is thus a structure that must be understood on its own terms. The model explains why the Downsian hypothesis that parties put forth policies in order to gain office rather than gain office to pursue policies is correct. It also explains why parties are oligarchies and how parties maintain their organizations despite an inevitable sense of dissatisfaction among many of their participants.