A. ROC Fidelity to Kremlin Policy in the 21st Century Much has been written to help illuminate and understand Russia's 1,000-year history of church-state relations, a dynamic interaction that has ranged from unwavering cooperation during the tsarist era to violent state suppression and cooption of the church at the hands of communist rule, with various shades in between. 1 Across these historical experiences, it may be said that the ROC has stood in consistent service of the state and its civilizational identity and status, with the only question being whether that service was offered willingly or from under the government's boot. 2 During the Byzantine era's symphonia, the ROC embraced the opportunity to control ecclesiastical concerns "on equal footing" alongside tsarist rule over the temporal realm. 3Years later, even as the gears of Soviet communism sought to grind down the ROC's stature and centrality, 4 Patriarch Sergey proclaimed the state's "joys and sorrows" were the same as the Church's. 5ith the fall of communism, the ROC confronted an open if uncertain future, poised for a religious renewal free of government exploitation.At least initially, however, this rebuilding transpired 6. Robert C. Blitt, How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia: A Guide in Progress, 2008 BYU L. REV.707, 722-23 (2008) (describing the Moscow Patriarchate's reaction to Western missionaries operating in Russia and the struggle to protect the "integrity" of the Russia's cultural identity).7. Vicki L. Hesli et al., The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia, 7 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 42, 49 (1999).8.For example, consider the 1997 law on freedom of conscience and religious associations.SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII SZ RF Russian Federation Collection of Legislation 1997, No. 39, Item 4465 (Federal Law No. 125-FZ) (Sept.24, 1997) (recognizing "a special role of the Orthodox Church in the history of Russia and the formation and development of its spirituality and culture" and further acknowledging "respect for the Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions constituting an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia") (emphasis added).9. Emily B. Baran, Negotiating the Limits of Religious Pluralism in Post-Soviet Russia: The Anticult Movement in the Russian Orthodox Church, 1990-2004, 65 RUSS.REV.637, 639-42 (2006) (describing the resurgence of the ROC as a cultural mainstay, attracting Post-Soviet Russia politicians to publicly align with the church).10. Id. at 638 (adopting democratic rhetoric and framing its demands in terms of protecting freedom of conscience against "totalitarian sects," the ROC legitimized its actions as within a secular, democratic framework).11. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Principle of Religious Freedom Cannot Be Taken as Absolute, Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Leading Officials of the Central Federal District, Kursk (July 21, 2004), in 47 EUROPAICA BULL., (Sep. 1, 2004), http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/47.aspx#7(emphasis added).On the other hand, Kirill vociferously rejected allegations of church interference in public life: "We have not healed the wounds inflicted by terror and genocide against the ROC, and we have just begun to rise from the knees.So what clericalization of society can be in question?!" 12 Fresh from his 2009 enthronement, newly minted Patriarch Kirill had grown sufficiently comfortable to assert that the emerging dynamic between church and state, in "our world spoiled by sin," was approaching as close as possible to the symphonia ideal: "Despite all the existing difficulties, the Church today retains, on the one hand, independence, and on the other-friendly relations with the state.And we should utilize this potential in the most varied spheres." 13A decade later, Kirill, at a celebration marking ten years at the ROC's helm, expressed thanks to God and, turning to Vladimir Putin, "especially you, Vladimir Vladimirovich . . .for this dialogue between church and state . . .I would even dare say that church and state have such relations for the first time in all the history of Russia . . .Even in the times of the Russian empire, the church did not have an equal partner in the face of the government." 14he rapprochement between church and state over the course of President Putin's multi-decade rule was not an anomaly.More broadly, Putin's larger effort to reshape Russian civil society "subordinate d all social organisations, including religious ones, to the goals set by the state." 15This exertion of control has resulted in "a consistent propaganda message reaching Russian citizens from the fully state-controlled media and representatives of social organisations, including the ROC." 16 As such, Russia's contemporary civil society sector often acts as "an extension of the state," effectively serving as "agents of state-determined social policy, not the 39.THE KREMLIN PLAYBOOK 3, supra note 23, at 84. 40.Id. at 81. 41.Id. at 83.For a recent example of collaboration between the ROC and the South Ossetian government, see Alan Gagloev took part in the Easter service in the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, PRESIDENT
Robert C. Blitt (Fri,) studied this question.