From return orientation to actual re-entry: modelling second-chance conversion after entrepreneurial failure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

Purpose This study aims to explain why a stated willingness to return to entrepreneurship after failure does not always translate into actual re-entry. It conceptualises suspended return as an intermediate post-failure state and compares its prevalence and drivers across Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Design/methodology/approach A comparative mixed-method design combines a survey of 450 entrepreneurs who experienced business closure in the previous five years (150 per country) with 30 semi-structured interviews. Descriptive comparisons are followed by PLS-SEM estimated on the sub-sample that remained oriented towards return (n = 317). Findings Actual re-entry reaches 71.3% in the UAE, 52.0% in Qatar and 38.0% in Saudi Arabia. Amongst entrepreneurs still oriented towards return, conversion into actual re-entry equals 85.6%, 74.3% and 65.5%, respectively. Conversion is more strongly associated with disclosure safety, support activation, visible institutional second-chance pathways and lower fear-based hesitation than with an abstract capacity to bounce back. Research limitations/implications This study is limited by cross-sectional, self-reported data, purposive network-based sampling that may under-represent entrepreneurs least willing to disclose failure and a conversion measure that captures realised re-entry versus active planning but not the quality or durability of the new activity. Its main research implication is that second-chance entrepreneurship should be analysed as a conversion problem, distinguishing post-failure psychological resources, re-entry preparedness and realised re-entry. By formalising suspended return, the paper opens a stronger agenda for longitudinal, time-to-event and subgroup research across Gulf and other emerging-economy settings. Practical implications Entrepreneurial ecosystems should monitor not only start-up creation but also second-chance conversion from return orientation to actual re-entry. Public programmes and support organisations need to make post-failure pathways visible, credible and socially usable. In Saudi Arabia, priorities include confidential mentoring, diagnostic support and trusted post-failure accompaniment; in Qatar, clearer and more navigable pathways; in the UAE, broader inclusion beyond the most visible founders. Incubators, accelerators, development banks and financiers can reduce suspended return through phased funding, transparent re-admission criteria and dedicated post-failure mentoring spaces. Social implications By showing that many failed entrepreneurs remain oriented towards return yet do not act, the study reframes failure as a socially mediated transition rather than a personal endpoint. Reducing stigma, increasing disclosure safety and normalising second-chance entrepreneurship can help founders seek support earlier and re-engage more confidently. More discussable and socially legitimate failure can improve inclusion, reduce exclusion after business closure and keep capable entrepreneurs connected to entrepreneurial ecosystems. These effects matter especially where reputational concerns and fear of judgement keep entrepreneurs in suspended return rather than allowing preparedness to become actual re-entry. Originality/value The paper distinguishes post-failure psychological resources, re-entry preparedness and realised re-entry, and introduces suspended return as a substantive empirical category. It reframes second-chance entrepreneurship as a conversion problem rather than a simple resource-availability problem.