Verification in Arms Control: beyond NTM

Abstract Arms control risk calculations are not made in accordance with a rational actor model. Judgements about the verification risks entailed in participation in an arms control agreement are made within the framework of Cold War anxieties and influenced by political and bureaucratic considerations. In approaching the strategic and theater nuclear arms control agenda of the 1980s, it will be necessary to devise verification regimes which not only provide reliable security guarantees against 'strategic breakout', but which also promote confidence among arms control policy-influential groups and strengthen coalitions in favor of participation in the agreements. At the same time it will be necessary to avoid inordinately intrusive inspection and verification procedures which hinder progress in arms control. This study explores the utility of a broad range of verification regimes which may be appropriate for future SALT, TNF and MBFR agreements in terms of their technical efficiency, contribution to confidence-building and minimalization of the inspection regime's intrusiveness.