Transport layer identification of P2P traffic

Since the emergence of peer-to-peer (P2P) networking in the late '90s, P2P applications have multiplied, evolved and established themselves as the leading `growth app' of Internet traffic workload. In contrast to first-generation P2P networks which used well-defined port numbers, current P2P applications have the ability to disguise their existence through the use of arbitrary ports. As a result, reliable estimates of P2P traffic require examination of packet payload, a methodological landmine from legal, privacy, technical, logistic, and fiscal perspectives. Indeed, access to user payload is often rendered impossible by one of these factors, inhibiting trustworthy estimation of P2P traffic growth and dynamics. In this paper, we develop a systematic methodology to identify P2P flows at the transport layer, i.e., based on connection patterns of P2P networks, and without relying on packet payload. We believe our approach is the first method for characterizing P2P traffic using only knowledge of network dynamics rather than any user payload. To evaluate our methodology, we also develop a payload technique for P2P traffic identification, by reverse engineering and analyzing the nine most popular P2P protocols, and demonstrate its efficacy with the discovery of P2P protocols in our traces that were previously unknown to us. Finally, our results indicate that P2P traffic continues to grow unabatedly, contrary to reports in the popular media.