Intelligent jamming design for disrupting DS-CDMA systems

This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.

In this paper, we investigate the problem of intelligent jamming design to attack a legitimate multiuser DS-CDMA downlink communication system. As the most common and realistic scenario, neither the channel state information (CSI) nor legitimate users' spread sequences (signatures) are known to the jammer. Therefore, the first task before intelligent jamming design is to acquire the necessary information of the legitimate DS-CDMA system by eavesdropping and analyzing its signals. To achieve this goal, we adopt the mature iterative least-squares (ILS)-based algorithm which can blindly identify the users' signatures in the DS-CDMA system. With the information of users' signatures, we use the periodic-total-square-correlation (PTSC) interference metric to quantify the impairment of the legitimate DS-CDMA system caused by the jamming signal. We attempt to optimize the jamming signal that maximizes the PTSC interference to legitimate DS-CDMA users under a given jamming power budget. Simulation studies confirm our analytical predictions and illustrate the efficiency of the designed optimal jamming signal on disrupting DS-CDMA communications.