The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

On August 3, 1968, at the peak of the Czechoslovak crisis, Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Soviet delegation to the Bratislava conference, together with the leaders of several Warsaw Pact countries-East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria-appeared to have reached a modus vivendi with Alexander Dubcek's leadership. Simultaneously, Warsaw Pact forces were ordered to cease their maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. Many observers of Soviet politics interpreted these events as a victory for the Czechoslovak reformers. Yet only seventeen days later the agreement was broken by the sudden military invasion of Czechoslovakia by these same countries-all partners of Czechoslovakia in the Bratislava agreement. Among observers of Soviet politics, there were some skeptics who doubted that the Bratislava rapprochement would last for long, but few expected a military move so soon. Also, as former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe, General James H. Polk, recently noted, both U.S. government and NATO officials considered a Soviet invasion to be highly unlikely.1 Even