This paper proposes a theoretical hypothesis on the primary function of dreaming as a mechanism for processing and classifying cognitive material registered below the threshold of consciousness. The central thesis holds that dreaming constitutes a preferential integration process for stimuli, emotions, and relationships between elements that during wakefulness fail to reach explicit awareness either due to insufficient activation or the absence of explicit connections within the conscious cognitive network. The brain, under conditions of reduced external input and neurochemically altered critical control, employs causal narrative structures as scaffolding to build connections between such elements, rendering them integrable into the overall cognitive structure. The systematic violation of physical principles characteristic of oneiric experience is reinterpreted not as an irrelevant epiphenomenon, but as a necessary functional effect: the connections constructed in dreams follow associative and emotional logics, not physical-causal ones, because it is on these logics that the processing of material lacking rational conscious anchoring operates. The phenomenon of recurring dreams is explained as a consequence of the stratification of unintegrated material across distinct cognitive depth levels, each with its own processing dynamics. Principal objections are examined analytically. The relevant cognitive neuroscience literature is evaluated in relation to its compatibility with the hypothesis. The conclusion is that the hypothesis is internally coherent, compatible with available neurobiological evidence, and identifiable as a falsifiable research programme.
Antonio Cosimati (Sat,) studied this question.
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