Repressed by the Scales of Justice: The Ramifications of the International Criminal Court

The recent movement toward international legal institutions has culminated in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Rome Statute. Proponents maintain that this supranational court will deter massive human rights violations by creating an external threat of punishment. I argue, however, that this very threat of punishment creates an incentive for state leaders to further repress their citizens. I hypothesize that both ratification of the Rome Statute and active involvement by the ICC will increase levels of repression. Using an ordered logistic regression, I find partial support for the hypothesized theory. Rome Statute ratification is associated with lower levels of repression while active involvement is associated with higher levels of repression. The findings have major implications for the international community as they imply that the mere existence of the ICC is a deterrent and that any action by the Court, however, may backfire, potentially worsening human rights.