Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
From the standpoint of a human geographer working in the field of environmental management, I have a particular interest in how to conduct research that reflects and attends to the recognition that, in Agrawal's terms, "there are different ways of knowing and understanding the world" (Agrawal 2009 this issue).As evidenced by this special issue, there is increasing acknowledgement from within the scientific ranks of the need for input into environmental management, ecology and conservation scholarship from knowledge traditions other than Western science.This is to be welcomed and is long overdue.Following Agrawal (2002), Turnbull (1997), Raffles (2005), and Jacobson & Stephens (2009 this issue), however, I remain frustrated with the persistent yet seemingly unavoidable a priori classification of knowledge and, as a consequence of varying assignment, the differential empowerment of knowledge that ensues.It is my contention that a key facet of this differential empowerment is due to the persistence of the Western scientific tradition as a framework to underpin and guide crosscultural research.One illustration of this persistence can be seen in the methodological strategies deemed appropriate to access, produce or 'extract' different types of knowledge and the manner in which resultant data is tested, verified, and in turn utilised.In what follows, I outline my thoughts on the significance of efforts to deploy different methodological strategies (see also contribution by Lowe et al. 2009 this issue) as a means to accommodate 'different ways of knowing' and offer insights from my own research into an environmental management issue in the Northern Cook Islands as a possible way forward.Crawford (2009 this issue) cites hypotheses and predictions as the "essential hallmarks of the Western scientific method".The epistemological framework for such research is further characterised as based on the tenets of "objectivity, measurement, test and logic" (Moller et al. 2009b: 226).Characterising the epistemological frameworks of traditional, indigenous, lay and local knowledges is a slightly more nebulous activity with retroduction (Moller et al. 2009a), and synchronicity (Moller et al. 2009b) cited as underlying qualities (see also Allen et al. 2009 this issue; Jacobsen & Stephens 2009 this issue; Wehi et al. this issue).Again, as with Agrawal and others, I remain unconvinced that attempting to delineate key differences between such epistemologies is necessarily useful, particularly if such acts of demarcation serve to further reify or, more perniciously, subtly denigrate that which is classified as 'nonscientific'.My concern here is that differences in epistemologies and particularly the Western scientific emphasis on objectivity, testing and logic has a tendency to spill over to form the framework against which all knowledge, regardless of the originating knowledge tradition, is tested.Indeed, with rare and notable exception (for example Watson & Huntington 2008) my reading of the majority of published cross-cultural research suggests that the framework
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Charlotte N L Chambers (2009) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: