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Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most‐able students, and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that injects private‐school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding restrictions like tuition constraints, such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.
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Epple et al. (2008) studied this question.
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