Rational intuitions: How reason underlies deontological moral judgments

ABSTRACTJoshua Greene’s dual process account contends that deontological moral judgments are the result of intuitions that are automatic, emotional and arational. Deontological intuitions cannot be trusted, Greene argues, because they are arationally acquired and deployed. However, the empirical evidence taken to support this view is methodologically flawed and does not support the utilitarianism-rational and deontology-emotional links that dual process theorists postulate. Instead, the available evidence supports a social domain account of moral development, in which the acquisition of moral intuitions is a rational process. That is, one acquires moral intuitions through repeated exposure to and reasoned engagement with moral information. The deployment of moral intuitions is not arational merely because it is not easily open to introspection. Indeed, if introspection were the sine qua non of rationality, then it would follow that the deployment of consequentialist intuitions is also arational. Although deontological intuitions are not infallible, the infirmities of deontological intuitions are equally shared by utilitarian intuitions. Thus, contrary to Greene’s recommendation, one need not abandon her deontological moral intuitions. Instead, intuitions – be they deontological or consequentialist – can be useful tools to guide moral reasoning.KEYWORDS: Dual process theoryintuitionreasondeontologyutilitarianism AcknowledgementsI am immensely grateful to Imola Ilyes for teaching that inspired this paper and invaluable guidance throughout the research and writing process. I also would like to thank Mauro Rossi for his helpful comments that sharpened my arguments. I am indebted to Andrée-Anne Cormier for reviewing the paper and her tireless mentorship. Finally, the arguments were immensely improved by the insightful comments of the anonymous reviewers of Philosophical Psychology. The views expressed in this essay are my own and do not reflect the views of my employer. All errors are my own.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Greene’s dual process theory has understandably evolved over time, which makes faithfully constructing his position more challenging. In particular, Part I details how his stance toward deontological moral judgments has softened. Even so, my understanding is that Greene’s central thesis remains unchanged: deontological moral judgments are systematically less reliable than consequentialist ones.2. Dual process theorists assume that emotionally valenced representations are associated with moral motivation and emotionally neutral representations are not, although these claims are controversial.3. Similarly, dual process theorists tend to neglect pluralism within consequentialism. For example, in cases designed to involve no harm but invoke feelings of disgust, dual process theorists presume that moral disapprobation is the result of irrationality (Haidt et al., Citation2000, pp. 11–12). Yet, Jacobson (Citation2012, pp. 301–02) argues that although a vignette stipulates that no harm accrues, one may still disapprove of an action because it is the type of action that typically causes harm. In other words, one may be a rule utilitarian rather than an act utilitarian.4. For most utilitarians, Greene included, physical proximity is morally irrelevant. Singer (Citation1972, p. 232) has famously argued that we owe as great a duty to alleviate the pain, suffering, and poverty of those living on the other side of the world as those living next door. Critics, however, argue that spatial proximity may serve as a proxy for whether a situation is an emergency and that one’s moral duty to assist is greater in emergency situations (Sterri & Martin Moen, Citation2021, pp. 2625–27).5. Some dual process theorists, notably Jonathan Haidt, believe that children are hardwired to be sensitive to foundational moral concepts. They argue that morality, like language, would emerge in children regardless of moral education (Haidt & Fredrik, Citation2008, p. 206). Moral education, they contend, guides which intuitive responses are adopted from an innate range and involves being socialized to understand a culture’s “application rules.” I do not dispute that certain moral sensitivities are innate. Endorsing social domain theory does not require the wholesale rejection of the role of innate mechanisms. I think we also both agree that one’s moral sense absent moral education would not “configure itself properly.” We disagree, however, on the role that reason plays in moral education. My central claim is that moral education is not mindless socialization; reason is crucial to moral education. Thus, the intuitions that result from moral education are rational.6. The inverse is also true; the fact that an adult explains the reasons underlying a moral rule does not necessarily mean that a child actively engages in moral reasoning. Rather, the child may reflexively internalize the moral rule as justified and parrot back the justification provided. However, given the available evidence, it is likely that the process involves more genuine reasoning than dual process theorists believe. That is, it is plausible that children subject the justification given for a moral rule to some degree of rational scrutiny, especially when one accounts for their natural curiosity and inquisitiveness. The inability of a child to later recall the justification provided at the point of learning does not necessarily entail that the learning process did not involve genuine moral reasoning.7. An example of the emotion-laden testimony is: “It’s really disgusting for [creatures to engage in the specified action]. Acting like this is really gross”8. Note that the children may not have been confabulating. The neutral actions the aliens engaged in were often similar to harm-causing actions that are familiar to children. For example, one picture depicted aliens building a machine that made the air misty (Rottman et al., Citation2017, p. 814). A child could reasonably have assumed that the adult was angered by this activity because it causes pollution, as the operation of machinery does on Earth. Thus, the children may have assumed adults found the alien activities infuriating because they harmed others’ welfare in the same way that analogous Earth activities do (Rottman et al., Citation2017, p. 821).9. I return to and extend upon the math metaphor shortly. While Ross focused on how prior learning gives rise to general rules that can be automatically applied to like cases through inductive reasoning, I highlight the possibility of applying prior learning to novel circumstances.10. One may object that a person’s willingness to discard an intuition has no bearing on the quality of the final judgment. Indeed, a moral judgment that is the product of conscious reasoning can be wrong. Thus, to say that one is engaging in genuine moral reasoning does not necessarily mean that one has arrived at a sound moral judgment. Instead, a willingness to abandon an intuition is indicative that a person is engaging in genuine moral reasoning. Consequently, the resulting moral judgment will be the product of genuine – albeit flawed – moral reasoning. In contrast, a person who holds steadfast to an intuitive judgment, despite encountering ample convincing countervailing reasons, cannot maintain that her judgment is the result of genuine reasoning (although it could still be correct).