Virtue and its bearers: predication and conceptual ambiguity in the contemporary debate

This paper addresses a persistent source of conceptual ambiguity in both virtue theory and positive psychology: the assumption that the predicate “virtuous” applies uniformly across different kinds of subjects. I argue that virtue is systematically predicated across at least three distinct planes—moral potential, concrete actions, and agential character—each of which involves different explanatory roles and implications for empirical research. By introducing this tripartite framework, the paper clarifies how several ongoing debates are partly sustained by conflating these planes. First, it resolves tensions in empirical research on flourishing by distinguishing when virtue functions as a causal contributor (at the level of action) and when it is constitutive (at the level of character). Second, it reframes the debate about the role of judgment in virtue, showing that whether judgment is constitutive or an external but necessary condition depends on the level of predication. Third, it clarifies the epistemic scope of positive psychology by showing how different empirical instruments operationalize virtue at different planes. The proposed framework shows that “virtuous” is not a univocal predicate: it takes on distinct, systematically related senses depending on whether it is applied to moral potential, action, or character. Recognizing this multivocity, rather than assuming a single uniform sense, is what allows the framework to dissolve several apparent disputes into differences of predication. This distinction provides a conceptual bridge between philosophical accounts of virtue and empirical research, helping to align measurement practices with theoretical clarity. More broadly, the paper contributes to the development of a conceptually rigorous science of virtue by identifying the conditions under which empirical findings can be meaningfully interpreted.