Trustees, Delegates, and Direct Democracy: Exploring Mass‐Elite Incongruence in Perceptions of Advisory Referendums

Previous research has demonstrated that the legitimacy of a majority‐rule procedure, as perceived by the general population, is dependent on turnout, the size of the majority, and the favourability of the outcome. In this article, we investigate how elected representatives assess referendum results and whether they are congruent with voters. To study this novel form of elite‐citizen procedural congruence , we compare a survey experiment administered to elected representatives in Norway with a probability‐based survey of the general population. Using a European Union (EU) membership referendum as a case of majority rule, our results demonstrate an incongruence between elites and citizens. To investigate the source of this procedural incongruence, we turn to the well‐known tension between the role of representatives as either trustees or delegates. The analysis shows that the trustee style of representation produces more procedural incongruence in the evaluation of the legitimacy of referendums.