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Some members of the disability studies community were likely puzzled when the call for submissions to this special issue of Disability Studies Quarterly began to circulate on various list-servs, facebook, and other social media last year. For although the tone of the call for papers seemed to indicate that the theme of the issue—Improving Feminist Philosophy and Theory by Taking Account of Disability—was somehow pathbreaking, risk-taking, contentious, and transgressive, the integration of disability within feminist theory and practice has been discussed and written about quite a bit since at least 1988, the year in which Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch published their landmark edited collection Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture, and Politics. In fact, Adrienne Asch, Anita Ghai, Alison Kafer, Helen Meekosha, Jenny Morris, Harilyn Russo, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and I are only some of the many disabled feminists who have written about the relationship between feminism and disabled women; how feminist theory must expand in order to incorporate the claims of disability theory; the potential that feminist disability studies has to transform feminism, and so on. Thus, some (or, perhaps many) members of the disability studies community may well have doubted that a forthcoming publication about feminism/feminist theory and disability would be theoretically innovative (not to mention, inspiring and subversive) at all. I want to point out, therefore, that this feminist issue of DSQ is unique, ground-breaking, and can be distinguished from other edited collections and special journal issues devoted to feminist disability studies and theory insofar as it focuses primarily on disability and feminist philosophy, inaugurating the emergence of feminist philosophy of disability, which is the term that I have coined to refer to the field of inquiry that simultaneously contributes to and widens the scope of feminist philosophy, philosophy of disability (as I have called it), and feminist disability studies, with all three of which feminist philosophy of disability shares many theoretical assumptions, social values, and political aims, but from all three of which it is distinct.
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Shelley Tremain (2013) studied this question.
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