Like many Western knowledge‐practices, experiential learning is seen to require what is, in effect, an act of self‐dismemberment, a splitting of the head from the body that denies the connectedness of knowledge to the body and thus loses sight of knowledge as a product of corporeally and emotionally grounded human life. This article first traces the history through which modernist knowledge‐practices were predicated on the rejection of the experiencing body and examines the impact of the resultant epistemology on power relationships. It then suggests that, as a function of memory, experiential learning is more properly understood as an act of re‐membering. It argues that experience is itself located in the body as well as in the social and material locations that bodies invariably occupy — and asks what a theory of experiential learning might look like that re‐members body and mind.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Elana Michelson (1998) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 3 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: