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This study focuses on the paradigmatic category of social association to question the general treatment of freedom of association in theories of justice. Social associations are organised, voluntary, and secondary associations that do not have any particular economic or political function and are not related to any external authority. This category is deployed to re-examine the relationship between freedom of association and the two moral powers. I support the argument that freedom of social association is not only an institutional condition for conscience, as stated by Rawls, but also has an evident direct connection with both moral powers. In particular, I show that it enables individuals to lead a life that they collectively affirm to be reasonable and valuable and develop a sense of value and confidence in their own abilities. This is the fundamental associative interest we have in self-respect, which has been rendered philosophically invisible in political liberalism by the category of nonpolitical association. I show that social associations and the right to establish such an association have a special importance for self-respect, and especially, for its social bases and I argue that institutions should provide citizens opportunities for the personal circumstances of self-respect in ensuring the social conditions necessary to establish social associations.
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Jérôme Grand (2022) studied this question.
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