The Role of the Principle of Object-relatedness in the Theory of Activity

The present state of the theory of activity (by which we mean the concept developed by Leont'ev and his school) undoubtedly deserves serious discussion. Such a discussion must not be reduced, as often happens, to a critique of this theory by representatives of other schools and currents in psychology that are based on different theoretical positions (i.e., to a criticism from without), on the one hand, or to an unconditional acceptance of all of its postulates by proponents of this theory, on the other. In my view, the kind of critique of this theory that is most relevant and acutely necessary in terms of both its prospects of development and the extent to which its perceptions accord with other psychological currents is of another sort, namely, a critique from within, by which I mean analysis of its own laws, of the internal logic of development of the theory, and of its internal contradictions, which define its present status and the dynamics of its development. Such an analysis should enable us to stimulate more effectively the internal mechanism of development and self-development of the theory of activity and ensure a transition from a period of stagnation that has produced nothing of note to a progressive evolution of its content and its explanatory power.