From Expertise to Trustworthiness: What Laypeople Can Really Assess about Experts

Abstract This article examines the debate about what non-experts can assess when determining who qualifies as an expert. We focus in particular on the debate about metacriteria for expertise that non-experts can rely on. We make three central claims about what non-experts can actually infer about experts: (1) metacriteria are not indicators of expertise; (2) instead, they are indicators of experience and lack of epistemic integrity, with the latter marking whether the preconditions for any meaningful assessment of expertise or experience are even given; (3) by reframing the discussion about metacriteria of expertise in this way, we situate the debate about the identification of experts within the broader debate on trust in science. We argue that indicators of experience and lack of epistemic integrity are best understood as indicators of epistemic trustworthiness. We also connect our analysis of these indicators of epistemic trustworthiness to questions raised in the context of epistemic trespassing. In particular, we argue that what distinguishes problematic epistemic trespassing from fruitful boundary crossing is that trespassing experts lack the required experience (i.e., specialist tacit knowledge).