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Introduction: A central tension exists within Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of mind: while he characterizes perception as an "extreme case of abduction," its involuntary nature seems to exclude it from the realm of reasoning. This paper aims to resolve this tension and develop a unified framework for understanding perception and emotion. Methods: We propose a two-tier model of abduction, distinguishing between abductive insight (the spontaneous, non-volitional generation of a hypothesis) and abductive reasoning (its conscious, conceptual endorsement). This theoretical model is integrated with the Predictive Processing framework, which provides a mechanistic account of abduction as hierarchical prediction error minimization. Results: The model demonstrates that the formation of the perceptual gestalt (the percept) constitutes abductive insight, while the conceptual categorization of that gestalt (the perceptual judgment) constitutes abductive reasoning. This framework is successfully extended to the domain of emotion, showing that Barrett's theory of constructed emotion instantiates the same architecture: core affect serves as abductive insight into interoceptive signals, and emotional categorization acts as abductive reasoning that makes affective states intelligible. Discussion: The two-tier model of abduction successfully resolves the Peircean tension and provides a unified account of perception and emotion. This synthesis contributes to philosophical psychology by revealing how conceptual operations (abductive reasoning) shape affective experience. Furthermore, it suggests practical implications for emotion regulation, pointing to interventions that can target either the level of core affect (abductive insight) or emotional categorization (abductive reasoning).
Jian Sun (Fri,) studied this question.