Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Study studies monotone competitive signaling equilibrium in matching markets, suggesting unique equilibria outcomes.
We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE where equilibrium outcomes - sender actions, receiver reactions, beliefs, and matching - are all monotone in the stronger set order. We show that if the sender utility is monotone-supermodular and the receiver's utility is weakly monotone-supermodular, a CSE is stronger monotone if and only if it passes Criterion D1 (Cho and Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987)). Given any interval of feasible reactions that receivers can take, we fully characterize a unique stronger monotone CSE and establishes its existence with quasilinear utility functions.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Han et al. (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: