The Limits of Damage Limitation

Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage limitation capabilities can make a vital contribution to U.S. strategy.Glaser and Fetter argue that various countermeasures can thwart U.S. surveillance systems relevant to hunting mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (pp. 68–70). They further argue that China can thwart attacks on its command and control (C2) by dispersing it to mobile platforms, pre-delegating launch authority, and adopting a launch-on-warning posture (pp. 73–74).truncated analysis. Glaser and Fetter conclude their analysis without extending the measure-countermeasure competition very far. In so doing, they fall prey to the “fallacy of the last move,” as though there were no counters to the countermeasures they propose.2 For instance, China can employ decoy mobile missile complexes, but countering decoys is routine in long-term military competitions.3In the case of surveillance of mobile missiles, U.S. space-based radar (SBR) or other wide-area surveillance could be used to cue other sensors, such as those using multi- or hyperspectral imaging. These sensors could then detect subtle differences between a decoy missile complex and an actual missile complex. Stealth is likewise no panacea; it too is subject to countermeasures. Of course, responses on both sides can continue. But without more detailed analysis, it is difficult to say whether the United States or China will win the measure-countermeasure battle over a protracted period of time.Likewise, Glaser and Fetter's argument that China can deploy its mobile ICBMs in mountainous areas to limit SBR line of sight ignores SBR's overhead perspective.4 Further, the road networks in valleys between mountains that could block radar coverage are often limited and steep. This would canalize mobile ICBMs operating in these areas and impose significant operational penalties. The countermeasure in this case might cost more in an operational sense than it would benefit the mobile missile force; for example, a brake failure on a descending transporter erector launcher (TEL) would be a disaster, and a very slow climb would make a located TEL a sitting duck.Moreover, Chinese use of underground facilities and tunnels to conceal TELs might end up being perversely helpful to U.S. planners. The United States has dedicated enormous resources to intelligence capabilities intended to detect and map underground facilities.5 If U.S. intelligence is able to detect the entrances or exits to such facilities, then they would become highly vulnerable to attack.Additionally, Glaser and Fetter acknowledge but do not assess two other systems that we have argued elsewhere could be used to hunt mobile missiles: stealthy penetrating unmanned aerial vehicles and unattended ground sensors.6 Admittedly, classification makes it difficult to fully evaluate these systems; nevertheless, they could contribute greatly to tracking mobile missiles. Both of these technologies are amplified by efforts to automate and rapidly integrate the data they provide for mobile missile hunting.7The difficulties in obtaining survivable C2 that bedeviled the superpowers during the Cold War belie Glaser and Fetter's somewhat blithe assessment of Chinese C2.8 C2 problems may be even more challenging today, as mobile command posts (even those in the air) can be tracked and targeted with the same sensors that track mobile missiles. In addition, non-kinetic options for disrupting C2 have proliferated over the past four decades. Even during the Cold War, the United States had apparently developed electronic warfare techniques to disable Soviet strategic C2 systems.9 Today, the possibility for offensive cyber operations against such systems is believed to be substantially greater.10operational and technical difficulties: wartime endurance. Survivable second-strike forces must endure through all phases of a conflict. Yet Glaser and Fetter give short shrift to the potentially low wartime endurance of Chinese forces.Glaser and Fetter assert that strict radio communications procedures and use of landlines will suffice to keep Chinese mobile ICBMs secure. These countermeasures are difficult to sustain over time, however, and all are subject to potential attacker responses. Mobile operations will likely impose demands for frequent communications when coordinating movement, halts, fueling, and rest breaks between the TEL and multiple support vehicles. It is also likely, given Cold War experience and current Chinese practices, that Chinese mobile ICBMs would communicate their status to higher headquarters at least sporadically.11 Unlike ballistic missile submarines, mobile missile patrols travel in open territory. Road conditions, weather, crew health, and other factors could negatively affect such patrols, which are also potentially vulnerable to attack from special operations units or other ground forces.In the face of these possibilities, sustained communications silence will become increasingly difficult over time. If communications are radio frequency, they are vulnerable to interception by U.S. signals intelligence sensors. Low probability of intercept transmissions will reduce but not eliminate that vulnerability for frequently communicating and difficult to duplicate TELs, which can be the target of barrage attack if imprecisely located. The use of dedicated military landlines would greatly restrict patrol areas while increasing mobile missile vulnerabilities if those lines were detected. Commercial landlines would impose fewer operational restrictions, but could be more easily penetrated. The United States was able to tap Soviet undersea naval communications in the Cold War; if motivated, it could likely tap Chinese commercial phone lines before a conflict begins.12In addition, Glaser and Fetter argue that China could jam or attack SBR satellites during wartime. This is by far the most compelling of their countermeasure arguments. In wartime, though, jammers can potentially be targeted, and the fact that an area is being protected by jamming could cue other sensors to the likely mobile ICBM patrol area. Anti-satellite systems can likewise be targeted. Wartime is likely to produce first-strike advantages in the surveillance-countersurveillance competition, which will not benefit the party that has to move from a vulnerable to a less vulnerable posture.Furthermore, as Glaser and Fetter point out, “[F]or its DF-31As to survive, China must be able to launch them from unprepared sites.” Glaser and Fetter's assumption, however, that China will be able to rely on “the Global Positioning System and other modern positioning and navigation services” is a dubious wartime proposition (p. 66). It seems more likely that Chinese mobile ICBMs will fire only from sites that have been pre-surveyed and geolocated in peacetime. Given the DF-31A's weight and maneuverability challenges, this will impose even more limitations on China's wartime operations.political and organizational difficulties. Even if the Chinese prove capable of technically demanding wartime operations, history suggests that they may face political and organizational challenges in preparing their forces during peacetime. This is especially true in the area of nuclear C2. All states face a sharp trade-off between negative control (assurances against unauthorized use) and positive control (assurances for authorized use) over their nuclear weapons. This trade-off produces strong incentives not to pursue the pre-delegation and launch-on-warning measures that Glaser and Fetter assume China will implement. These incentives may be particularly strong in authoritarian states, where the threat of internal unrest to nuclear forces, strains in civil-military relations, and worries about political succession may all bias decisions toward prioritizing negative control over survivable nuclear C2.This pattern was demonstrated in the only other comparable case: the Cold War Soviet Union.13 Moscow's civilian leadership abhorred pre-delegation. The Soviets also prioritized negative control in their launch procedures, which required no less than three members of the high command to authorize weapons release and two to of the launch Glaser and Fetter point out, China to negative control over an posture for its mobile ICBMs in (pp. Glaser and Fetter from their analysis and political factors to U.S. Yet damage limitation could be even if technically to the political of damage and Fetter argue that damage-limitation capabilities to the of U.S. to their analysis the of political in the nuclear and we of political in the nuclear as a competition in at in an and of and wartime a of a nuclear through or the most of such Cold War two as the of the of at in a and the of nuclear capabilities between the is then damage-limitation capabilities are a of in political with damage-limitation capabilities will from an nuclear as a if its nuclear will damage-limitation capabilities not be and to produce with political The is between the two and probability of in damage by The other only at the of its is more to it has probability of be we do not other of especially those on the political at about U.S. posture will but may not U.S. and Chinese such a advantages for damage-limitation and The most for the U.S. nuclear is during an with as Chinese in such a is the only plausible in which might be to launch nuclear attacks on the U.S. Glaser and Fetter argue that damage-limitation capabilities to of such to U.S. capabilities for limited nuclear options U.S. that Chinese nuclear attack an and damage to China even if nuclear limited (pp. the same time, damage-limitation capabilities of Glaser and Fetter vulnerability of China's nuclear forces could incentives for China to use them in a or (p. is a If a China is to employ it is of the U.S. to in then would it be by U.S. damage-limitation capabilities toward which would an U.S. are likely to Chinese in which case U.S. damage-limitation capabilities in the of or those capabilities will make the Chinese about their nuclear in which case damage limitation will contribute more to than Glaser and Fetter of nuclear superiority and to this that its was at might an a of with limited which will prove the when we have the Yet a an with significant damage-limitation capabilities will that will only as far as its is to which is to be very as Glaser and Fetter acknowledge (p. over damage limitation on the of Chinese to the United States even if China a If the United States were by such U.S. by are to Chinese at the of and U.S. damage-limitation capabilities could also be in a with potentially the Chinese from military and the United extended of its Glaser and Fetter however, that damage limitation can to extended in the is They United in with the United have for Chinese (p. and Fetter's on is in is to the Chinese that U.S. and are or even the are to their If the most likely will be China's about its vital the will to a political that may in a or even an nuclear will to its to and in the that its political will be In such the will less weight in Chinese if the were no would have in the The United States may nuclear even of If the of is damage-limitation capabilities could make a contribution to the of such in the only likely to be and damage-limitation capabilities might provide the United States with benefits during Glaser and Fetter such of U.S. the United States without damage-limitation capabilities in the Cold War case (p. In the by these capabilities a of arms and from the Chinese (p. all the that Glaser and Fetter against damage this is by far the most are and however, to that the United States will be able to signals to the of its posture Glaser and Fetter's analysis of U.S. missile a (p. it is that high area no threat to Chinese strategic nuclear but that has not from negative about U.S. this surveillance vital to damage limitation are from those for other even if the United States damage limitation and it would these capabilities for these other and China would likely that the United States was a capability of U.S. to the we that factors can only a in the on a less But if the become highly damage-limitation capabilities could produce The problems that Glaser and Fetter will become more in such an and may to the of Cold War very capabilities will contribute to China from even with the United however, the political is the most in a about the U.S. nuclear The to competition with China are to political through the most such as or through strategic no however, of the that such strategic would The that U.S. are likely to is the of Glaser and Fetter's that should U.S. as though the to is not seems to current U.S. political have for political that will be subject to political that factors will only at the the United States Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should a damage-limitation capability against China's strategic at this however, they the advantages of a damage-limitation and do not even more and options for a strategic with these are it that the United States should not this it should its damage-limitation capability and nuclear superiority over while the of China's of an nuclear and Fetter by the of for an for damage In they the of damage in the of nuclear Glaser and Fetter are that China's nuclear is increasingly difficult if not impossible as China and its but this is an high limitation is of as a not a is no beyond which the to limit damage in a nuclear to U.S. would to as of the as in the of a nuclear and damage-limitation capability (even far the by Glaser and would be argue would have to argue that of is or which is an and Fetter's is to of nuclear in the of the nuclear and a they damage limitation and extended of the nuclear those Glaser that political of nuclear are of as of nuclear nuclear a states to in these in nuclear superiority and of vulnerability to nuclear affect the of even when both sides an China will be less likely to the United States and its and to against if the United States a damage-limitation In other a U.S. damage-limitation capability and extended have whether this also to nuclear but that it has a threat against a nuclear In other nuclear superiority in the has for on U.S. as in the of such as that which would if the United States nuclear advantages over would be in through the of U.S. is a far and Fetter the possibility of a arms and with China if the United States the of to China's nuclear is a however, than an of the United States and its that China will likely capability of the by while the United States to maintain a damage-limitation This by of and has been in with Chinese in track in and in over the past two The Chinese would be in that their a second-strike which is all that its the same time, the United States would maintain the nuclear that it to nuclear in and strategic in the such an the for a strategic between the United States and This would be more than an of U.S. and and the of and and for their in to the United States The a of and technical limitations to only with those we are most that we by for an for damage that we damage limitation as a of a and that damage-limitation capability would be U.S. would to as of the as and the of damage when the United States would such high of that it might be a three of damage a which damage in that are to at the a which the United States would be to in its current and a which the United States should be to even a in the probability of nuclear to reduce the damage of an of these fully the in the of the of a nuclear and the two are to that in the of a nuclear attack is of is or if those were to of and for in a those would have but far less than in United If these no the United States might pursue a damage-limitation capability as against an even But if the cost of being were of of the might not be the the probability of nuclear with China is very the the probability by the of the damage of of U.S. resources to and the of would have to be to the of damage such would be but we of nuclear damage limitation would not the limitation can be the at low of nuclear and we have elsewhere about the potential of such a capability against nuclear even more is that a damage-limitation capability would not only be but would also the probability of nuclear of the highly required to a U.S. damage-limitation capability would the increasing the probability of both and nuclear It would also strategic incentives for both the United States and China to to the use of nuclear weapons and the probability of their and unauthorized Given the benefits of damage limitation at such high of the of nuclear would more than the in a negative for U.S. pursuit of a damage limitation also that we to in the of the nuclear that we damage limitation and extended is a in The of the nuclear to two that in other these states in a of when has a damage-limitation the of a damage-limitation capability analysis that the of the nuclear a and that we the nuclear and developed by and In we fully the of these of vulnerability to nuclear can For example, we that to reduce the of an nuclear the U.S. damage-limitation capability the United to pursue that the probability that the would to (p. also But this is likely to be if U.S. vulnerability to we when a in which the United States an of a U.S. damage-limitation capability could this by the possibility of nuclear less for the United States than for the and U.S. damage-limitation capability would the United States at a significant (p. and of other arguments. For example, we do not a between that a damage-limitation capability would to the U.S. to a Chinese limited nuclear attack against the U.S. and a U.S. damage-limitation capability would incentives for China to launch a limited nuclear attack during a Both could be In support of the we argue that China would likely be from a limited nuclear by the of U.S. limited nuclear options and the United to China with an nuclear But that China would likely be is not to say that it would be in all the possibility that China could a over an that is that it might be to employ to the United States to these conditions, a U.S. damage-limitation capability could China to the for the before it with and that China could a even if the United States and its highly if the are however, that this is in a conflict over also that a significant damage-limitation capability could contribute to a by Chinese might have in an of the that the contribution to would be however, even when both the possibility of nuclear a of to we that the of on the possibility of to are likely by the we and the United States could become in a that in from a In this of to to nuclear would do to the these however, the probability of to nuclear (p. makes that we with and not so on the of their but on the of the and political of a damage-limitation The of these other the of of of nuclear and the of and political factors in which are to can about to the which a damage-limitation capability could an For example, and argue that capabilities not be and The other only that its is more to it has probability of This point is and the for the damage-limitation capability the United States must but about the U.S. damage-limitation capability should reduce its and also that the most likely will be China's about its vital the to a political that can be by forces, and the not the of a damage-limitation In we have to possibilities, which we the of a damage-limitation and it less and more to technical analysis of damage we with and on the to the of the last are countermeasures to the countermeasures we countermeasures to those and so The is whether it is likely that the United States could in this competition and sustain a damage-limitation capability against China over the term, if whether the benefits of such a capability would the of the In such must in that China is an increasingly and capable of the United States in nuclear China's to with the United States will that of the Soviet during the Cold on China not to use this to do it is to maintain an is not a for China's current nuclear that Chinese the to have a survivable to U.S. nuclear with and that and technical damage In the of satellites will make it more difficult to conceal mobile missile while also it more difficult to capabilities through in that of satellites could provide coverage of the current commercial satellites can be extended the and target and and the of decoys and of satellites in can also from on the their and in and are the of the possibility of at cost than was will be and that jamming is a compelling jammers can be targeted or used to cue other sensors. however, and easily China could to deploy of jammers for mobile and the mobile missiles could be with an the United States with of of potential than to make decoys more China could make its missiles and more decoys by them with that will to overhead if and tracking mobile missiles can be more survivable by them in areas where they can move in and by them the to travel at high and to the from a The Chinese of the an area than and is with areas in which a can travel of in It should be to a transporter erector launcher (TEL) that could travel up to over such in the most case for damage the of such a TEL could be and U.S. ballistic missiles could be a TEL could be a area by the the For the U.S. ballistic missile the intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missile have an area of to against TELs to to In this analysis for damage the barrage attack would be able to only to But is not and the United States would not launch its missile against Chinese mobile missiles. more plausible the United States able to a of Chinese mobile a more capability against Chinese mobile missiles, the United States would tracking of TELs and of while the missiles are in This would survivable and surveillance and communications with vehicles that can target that such and to the up the possibility that could employ electronic jamming the or even the to a area or a U.S. about the possibility of such countermeasures has the United States from its intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles to launch for navigation or in the of an and the possibility that unattended ground sensors could be used to track TEL the difficulties with of such they would only if TELs are to road and even then they could be or with of to U.S. and on China's to launch from unprepared missile could not rely on navigation for This is not a difficult to could of potential launch sites in at low could navigation such as or positioning to provide in mobile missile could rely on navigation which would be for of a few in that high is not for attacks against and that stealthy penetrating unmanned aerial vehicles might be used to and mobile missiles. they classification makes it difficult to fully evaluate such but there are to that this would prove difficult to implement. the at which can be by radar and other sensors, but not them are countermeasures to such as the use of and and sensors to cue surveillance at high and to area coverage and while of the for low and high could have of and that communicate with but up the possibility of electronic countermeasures. would have of to launch sites even if from the of or the The of even such would give for such as the of a missile of are of no that make it likely that the United States will have an in a damage-limitation capability against But if do provide such an China would have the of an to launch on of a U.S. The will make and able to detect missile on and provide tracking and This would give China of a U.S. attack and China to launch its forces would be no U.S. countermeasure to such a China could launch to for in the of its command and Both measures would of and unauthorized use of nuclear but China could that these were to U.S. damage-limitation the by and and on the of the technical and strategic by damage and contribute to this in their however, that the United States should efforts to and its damage-limitation capability against China: the United for a damage-limitation capability are too and the political and strategic are too