Frank Ankersmit: From narrative to experience

This paper analyzes key issues in the work of Frank Ankersmit: narrative, representation and sublime historical experience. It argues that his recent turn to experience marks a shift from an interest in narrative and the textual dimension of the past to an examination of the notion of an experience about the past. It suggests that although Ankersmit is usually associated with postmodernist avangardism in historical theory (narrativism, constructivism), as can be seen in his theory of historical representation, his understanding of the concept of historical experience and the sublime can be seen as regression. Thus, although Ankersmit had pushed historical theory beyond the linguistic turn, his most recent work can be understood as a return to a traditional Romantic view of immediate experience combined with an Enlightenment analysis of it. Keywords: Frank Ankersmitnarrativehistorical representationhistorical experiencesublimenew humanities Acknowledgments For consultation, criticism, and valuable insights which contributed to the final shape of this text, I am grateful to Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White, Richard Vann, Brian Fay, Keith Jenkins, and Alun Munslow. Notes 1. Ankersmit's interest in those issues is manifested in his subsequent books. The first of those problems is addressed in Narrative logic (1983) and the opening chapters of History and tropology (1994). This latter book documents Ankersmit's transition from questions of narration and narrative substances (about which nonetheless he will continue to write) to the problem of historical representation, which is discussed in depth in his next book (Historical representation, 2001). Ankersmit's theory of historical experience is expounded in his Sublime historical experience (2005). Ankersmit holds academic degrees in History and Philosophy. Beginning with his Master's theses, his research interests have centered upon two areas: (1) political philosophy – his Master's thesis in History, defended in 1973, dealt with the Kantian foundations of contemporary liberalism, and (2) narrativist philosophy of history, which was the subject of his Master's thesis in Philosophy, defended in 1977. This latter study was the germ of Ankersmit's doctoral dissertation in philosophy, Narrative logic (Ankersmit Citation1983). The dissertation was published in 1983 under the same title. 2. See Ankersmit's brief history of narrativism (Ankersmit and Kellner Citation1995, 278–83) Cf. also Chris Lorenz's critique of White's and Ankersmit's narrativism as inverted positivism (Lorenz Citation1998) and Ankersmit's polemic with this view (Ankersmit Citation2001, 50ff). 3. For a comparison of Ankersmit's 'narrative idealism' in Narrative logic and David Carr's 'narrative realism' in Time, narrative and history, see Crowell Citation1998. 4. It was Ankersmit's publications in History and Theory in the late 1980s that won him a reputation as a leading historical theorist: 'The dilemma of contemporary philosophy of history' (1986); 'Historical representation' (1988); and 'Historiography and postmodernism' (1989), a debate with Perez Zagorin about Ankersmit's postmodern views on historical writing (Zagorin Citation1990; Ankersmit Citation1990). 5. Collingwood says: 'The chief business of seventeenth-century philosophy was to reckon with seventeenth-century natural science … The chief business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history' (Collingwood Citation1939, 78–9). 6. Ankersmit claims, however, that 'truth is, of course, a non-negotiable requirement and a conditio sine qua non at the level of description' (Ankersmit Citation2001, 294, fn46) and elsewhere writes: 'I insist most empathically that this should under no circumstance be interpreted as an attack on truth. Truth is our only criterion when we have to decide about what to say about the past in terms of singular statements. Nothing in my argument would compel us to question this absolutely basic fact about the writing of history, and I have no ambition to dispute most of what empiricists have said about this. Where truth has its role to play, we should under all circumstances most dutifully respect its rights' (Ankersmit Citation2005, 239). 7. When Ankersmit abandoned narration for representation – a shift signalled by his 'Historical Representation' and fully revealed by his History and Tropology – the concept of representation replaced the term 'narrative substance'. 8. It must be noted that Ankersmit's analogy between the historian and the painter refers only to figurative, realistic painting (still life, landscape, portrait), since historical discourse is also realistic. This analogy does not apply to other styles of painting. 9. Ankersmit says explicitly that 'it was this essentially philosophical problem of getting beyond epistemology that made me interested in the notion of experience' (Moskalewicz Citation2007, 253–4). 10. For Ankersmit the link with politics has always been essential. Politics and historism have always been his guides in his intellectual career. In Ankersmit's view historicism is the greatest achievement of historical writing. It was the only approach developed by historians themselves and not imported from other disciplines. Hence, Ankersmit says, 'all my writings has always been an exhortation to return to the historicism of Herder, Ranke, Humboldt' (Ankersmit Citation2003, 434; Citation1995a; Citation1995b; Iggers Citation1995). 11. Ankersmit rejects the accusation of naive empiricism, arguing that only complex experience can give us access to reality. This complexity involves harmony between subject and object, which also makes possible suspending the context of experience. 12. It also has been noted by Richard J. Bernstein, who writes: 'F. R. Ankersmit is a provocative theorist who seeks to rethink the concept of historical experience in light of poststructuralist and postmodern ideas, but he hardly seems to be a central figure in the debates about history and experience that have concerned most contemporary historians' (Bernstein Citation2006, 274). 13. Ankersmit fails to recognize that as early as in the 1980s the problem of experience was addressed by anthropologists (Turner and Bruner Citation1986) and soon afterward by archaeologists (Shanks Citation1992). For a comprehensive history of scholarly interest in experience, see Martin Jay, Songs of experience. Jay compares Joan W. Scott's and Ankersmit's approaches to experience in the chapter 'History and experience: Dilthey, Collingwood, Scott and Ankersmit' (Jay Citation2005; Cf. also: Zammito Citation2000). 14. Ankersmit says: 'I have no pretension to change the historical discipline. If I have any revolutionary pretensions (in spite of my rather conservative turn of mind), then these are for philosophy only. Indeed, there I would like to rearrange things a little' (Moskalewicz Citation2007, 256). 15. In addition, this way of thinking was certainly influenced by the fact that Ankersmit first went to college to study physics and mathematics, which he gave up three years later to study history instead. 16. Raphael Samuel indicates that 'real life experiences' understood 'both as a subject for historical inquiry, and as a litmus-paper to test the abstract against the particular' often occupied the central place in History workshop. This special interest in 'real life experiences' originated from various influences. As he writes, it 'comes from our original constituency of mainly worker-writers, and the high claims we were making for historical work to which the writer was bringing the fruits not only of research, but also of personal life history'. Among other sources of influences Samuel mentioned were micro-sociology, social and cultural anthropology, the rise of the women's movement and dissatisfaction with the existing Marxist discussion of ideology and consciousness (Samuel Citation1980, 165–6). 17. There has been no debate between Scott and Ankersmit, but their approaches to experience have been contrasted by scholars (Jay Citation2005; Zammito Citation2000). 18. For various understanding of the term 'new humanities', see Ruthven Citation1992; Fuery and Mansfield Citation1998; Spellmeyer and Miller Citation2006; Domanska Citation2006b.